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5 
Issues and Conclusions 
European Energy Security Reimagined 
Mapping the Risks, Challenges and Opportunities of 
Changing Energy Geographies 
Energy security needs to be reimagined in light of the 
sea change in energy related to the energy transition 
and changing energy geographies. As new regional 
energy orders emerge in the Northern Hemisphere 
such as the EU and the Energy Community, the Eura-
sian Economic Union and China’s new Silkroad Initia-
tive “One Belt, one Road”, energy corridors could 
become more trans-regional and cross-border and a 
more heterogeneous energy system could develop. Yet, 
the proliferation of renewables could also result in a 
localization of energy production, driving trends in 
the opposite direction. 
The trajectory and outcome of the global energy 
transition remains uncertain. The energy transition 
could promote greater cross-border connectivity, 
which in turn could bring potential risks and oppor-
tunities over the short and long term. However, the 
transition from the fossil fuel world to a sustainable 
energy future is not guaranteed, and there are risks 
inherent in the uncertainty over the transition’s devel-
opment path. This uncertainty in and of itself breeds 
risk. These cross-border energy and security dynamics 
may also reinforce geopolitical risks for Europe. 
The shifts in energy and political geographies are 
a challenge for Germany and the EU, as geopolitical 
turmoil has come closer to the EU’s borders. While 
geopolitical crises have not yet resulted in an energy 
(supply) crisis, currently low energy prices and well-
supplied markets should not distract from emerging 
trends and risks related to interconnected energy 
trade and markets and the nascent energy transition’s 
uncertain outcome. 
This ‘energy security dilemma’ may result in com-
mercial disputes, supply interruptions, and potential 
energy sector retrenchment in national terms, poten-
tially spilling beyond economic relations to impact 
political relationships and geopolitical constellations. 
This dilemma could also elevate the energy security 
paradigm over climate and environmental concerns, 
causing parties to lose sight of long-term goals, with 
severe repercussions for climate mitigation and the 
EU’s competitiveness 
The multilateral climate change agreement reached 
under the UNFCCC process in December 2015, known 
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6 
as the Paris Agreement, provides the impetus and 
momentum for a global energy transition. The tran-
sition will require international cooperation, sustain-
able growth models, shifts in investments and the 
development of disruptive technologies. It may also 
drive cross-border energy initiatives and require 
harmonized standards and norms. Policymakers need 
to rethink regulatory frameworks and incentives, 
financial and investment practices and energy system 
structures, while the role of and relationship between 
markets and states may need re-examining. 
Amid this energy transition, the global political 
landscape is also profoundly changing. China’s rise 
and the pivot from West to East, from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific, has the potential to reshape regional 
political relationships, economic patterns and inter-
national cooperation. As Europe struggles with in-
ternal issues and external relations, developments to 
its east, including One Belt, One Road, the Eurasian 
Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganization, show that the impetus for regional organi-
sations, multilateral institutions and governance is 
increasingly emanating from Asia. These initiatives 
also suggest that the Eurasian continent could become 
interconnected via energy trade, transit and infrastruc-
ture, driven in large part by Beijing but also by Mos-
cow. This occurs amid strains in Western cohesion due 
to Donald Trump’s election as the 45th US President. 
Maintaining a cohesive “Western” governance approach 
during the Trump Administration will likely be dif-
ficult, particularly in climate policy. 
This presents a broad challenge for German and 
European energy security and external energy gov-
ernance, which should be understood and addressed 
through the prism of these tectonic shifts across 
Eurasia. These structural changes in the energy sector 
and in political alignments could redraw the energy 
map across the northern hemisphere, while the 
emergence of “infrastructure(d) geography” impacts 
economic, political and societal relations. This could 
cause energy insecurity as simultaneous changes in 
geopolitics and energy breed uncertainty, which 
influences the actions and reliability of partners and 
hinders investment and planning. 
At the same time, changing energy geography 
offers opportunities alongside challenges, which Euro-
pean external governance should be adapted to ad-
dress. The looming fragmentation of energy spaces 
and orders has to be transformed into an opportunity 
for cross-regional dialogue and cooperation rather 
than resulting in fault lines between (energy) regions 
and the potential emergence of “competitive regional-
ism” to emerge between blocs like the EU, the EU/Ener-
gy Community and the Eurasian Economic Union and 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The absence 
of shared principles amid the proliferation of infra-
structure across regions could turn integration into 
fragmentation, potentially causing energy-related 
disputes. 
Multilateral governance is necessary to increase 
interconnection in energy and achieve economies of 
scope and scale. Maintaining European energy secu-
rity and competitiveness will require a renewed Euro-
pean commitment to external energy governance and 
a reinvigorated EU appetite for multilateral initiatives 
and inclusive governance. The EU must simultaneously 
improve internal coherence, particularly if the Energy 
Union is to make a substantial progress on integra-
tion. 
The EU should seek to understand and raise aware-
ness of new energy risks. This includes hard security 
risks like the physical disruption of flows and cyber 
threats; complex “soft” risks stemming from social, 
economic and political factors; and environmental 
and climate hazards. Acknowledging that there is no 
one institution to address these risks, energy and for-
eign policy approaches and existing dialogue plat-
forms, multilateral regimes and international organi-
sations should be adapted to do so. The EU should 
work with partners across regions to establish dialogue 
channels and utilize existing mechanisms to under-
take risk mapping, confidence building and crisis 
management through institutions like the OSCE or 
UNECE. 
Ultimately, the EU should promote coherence and 
establish common principles to avoid fragmentation 
and facilitate exchange and cooperation. A proactive 
EU approach to the risks and opportunities of integra-
tion and connectivity is essential to ensure a coopera-
tive and level playing field across Eurasia. To foster 
connectivity and retain competiveness, the EU must 
shape the energy landscape by engaging in regional 
governance and promoting a minimum set of rules. 
 SWP Berlin 
European Energy Security Reimagined 
March 2017 
 
 
 
7 
Introducing the Dynamic Energy Landscape 
 
Conceptualising Energy Geography and 
Energy Security 
The EU is working toward an Energy Union, an under-
taking that aims in part at making the EU a more 
political actor with respect to energy.1 To achieve this, 
the EU must enhance and strengthen internal and 
external coherence while positioning itself vis-à-vis the 
on-going energy transformation and the reconfigura-
tion of oil, gas and electricity markets. The external 
dimension is particularly relevant given the EU’s role 
as an energy importer and a norm exporter and its 
geographic position in a wider neighbourhood through 
which energy imports flow. Simultaneous changes 
in energy and geopolitics require attention to current 
and future qualitative changes in energy risks, par-
ticularly as the energy transition is only in the begin-
ning stages. This paper attempts to move beyond 
quantitative assessments and modelling supply and 
demand to grasp the qualitative nature of change and 
begin re-conceptualizing energy security approaches 
to account for present risks and uncertainty and 
change on the horizon. 
Energy security can be considered the reliable 
provision of energy in the form, place and time it is 
needed.2 In other words, energy security is “the un-
interrupted supply of energy sources at an affordable 
price”.3 According to the IEA, energy security has 
both long-term and short-term aspects. In considering 
energy security, and the durability of this definition 
amid the discussed changes, the EU should recognize 
that while other actors may use the same definition, 
their method or strategy for obtaining energy security 
could be different and potentially at odds with the EU. 
The EU must both maintain its energy security and 
 
1 This paper is an outcome of the project “Energiesicherheit 
in der OSZE” lead by Kirsten Westphal. Members of the project 
team were Indra Øverland (NUPI), Ellen Scholl (SWP), and 
Katja Yafimava (OIES). Ellen Scholl and Kirsten Westphal 
would like to thank Indra Øverland and Katja Yafimava for 
their useful comments. All errors are solely ours. 
2 The Clingendael International Energy Programme, Study on 
Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics (The Hague, January 2004). 
3 IEA Definition, see http://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/ 
(accessed 6 December 2016). 
understand how similar efforts by its neighbours 
might impact its own supply environment. 
Energy security is a key concern for the EU, an energy 
importer reliant on producing and transit countries 
for supply. The majority of the EU’s oil and gas imports 
originate in neighbouring regions. For gas, the EU 
relies mainly on Russia, Norway and Algeria, which 
together provide over 80 percent of imports (see graph 
1, p. 8).4 More than 80 percent of gas supply is trans-
ported via pipe/pipelines. For oil, more than 60 per-
cent of EU imports come from Russia, Norway, Algeria, 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (see graph 2, p. 8).5 Ukraine, 
Belarus and Turkey are vital transit countries through 
which EU energy travels. 
Apart from import dependence and transit security 
concerns, the energy system transition will result in 
new and shifting energy geographies. These dynamics 
could enlarge energy markets, as technology and 
interconnection broadens energy trade across borders. 
However, the localization of energy production and 
distributed renewable generation may also slow trends 
toward a globalized energy world. The energy tran-
sition’s uncertain character, path and outcome create 
tension and risks and the changing energy geography 
and infrastructure require a redefining of European 
approaches to energy security. 
While the EU is and will remain a major importing 
region, as the nexus of the energy world shifts east-
wards the EU’s declining relative share of energy con-
sumption could also reduce its market power. Europe’s 
market share has declined to 11.4 percent of gross glo-
bal domestic/inland consumption and 5.6 percent of 
global energy production (see graph 3 and 4, p. 8).6 
Given that the EU’s security, wealth and prosperity 
largely depends on securing stable and affordable en-
ergy supplies, the EU will have to proactively address  
 
4 EU Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, In-Depth 
Study of European Energy Security, SWD (2014) 330 final/3 (Brus-
sels, 2 July 2014), 45, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/ 
files/documents/20140528_energy_security_study.pdf (ac-
cessed 6 December 2016). 
5 Ibid, 32. 
6 EU, EU Energy in Figures. Statistical Pocketbook 2016 (Brussels: 
EU, 2016), 10 and 12. 
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Graph 1 
Extra-EU imports of natural gas by country of origin (%); 
total 2014: 304 bcm 
Source: Eurostat, Energy statistics-imports (nrg_12), 19 Dec. 2016. 
Graph 2 
Extra-EU imports of crude oil and NGL by 
country of origin (%); total 2014: 502 million tons 
Source: Eurostat, Energy statistics-imports (nrg_12), 19 Dec. 2016. 
Graph 3 
World Final Energy Consumption by Region;  
total 2014: 9,425 Mtoe 
* Excluding China and OECD countries of Asia. 
Source: EU Energy Statistical Pocketbook 2016, 14. 
Graph 4 
World Energy Production by Region;  
total 2014: 13,805 Mtoe 
* Excluding China and OECD countries of Asia. 
Source: EU Energy Statistical Pocketbook 2016, 10. 
 
energy shifts and shape the energy landscape to avoid 
becoming a mere “taker” of developments subjected 
to rules set increasingly by others. Given its status as 
an importer, internal market design and unbundled 
energy companies, the EU relies on liberalized and 
free energy trade and liquid and competitive markets. 
Bearing these strategic challenges in mind, we 
examine emerging energy risks in the context of the 
shifting energy and political landscape. The paper 
describes developments underway in the energy world 
and identifies current and future risks on the horizon 
in order to identify tools and engagement strategies 
to mitigate or ameliorate them. These new risks, chal-
lenges and opportunities are described through the 
prism of energy landscapes, infrastructure(d) geography 
and market orders. Changes in the energy world may 
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9 
reflect changes in the political world – energy systems 
could become increasingly regional, cross-border 
and heterogeneous as the political landscape becomes 
increasingly multipolar. However, it is also possible 
that more local generation from renewable energy 
resources, along with the rise of anti-globalization, 
protectionism and anti-trade sentiments could lead 
to constriction, rather than expansion, in energy 
trade. In any case, the rising demand and the need 
for modernization will go hand in hand with creating 
new “infrastructured energy geographies” crafted out 
of production sites, electricity lines and pipelines as 
well as processing facilities etc.7 In particular the tran-
sition to a low carbon energy system will require “a 
major expansion of investment in modern, clean, and 
efficient infrastructure”.8 This involves reconfiguring 
current patterns and scales of economic and social 
activity.9 This is also a temporal process in which the 
starting points and development stages and duration 
of the transition to ensure “availability and accessibil-
ity of energy services in a carbon-constrained world” 
will differ.10 
Informed by the work of Bouzarovski et al.,11 we 
highlight that the socio-technical assembly of facilities 
and networks for energy production, transmission, 
processing and distribution across national bounda-
ries impact governance and regulatory practices.12 We 
thus assume an “infrastructural realm” 13 in addition 
to the spatial realm of market and/or political orders. 
Additionally, “fossil fuels and also renewable energy 
sources like hydropower or wind are increasingly 
located in remote areas within or outside national 
borders”, necessitating networks that cross borders 
as a well as jurisdictions.14 Simultaneously, new cor-
 
7 Gavin Bridge, Stefan Bouzarovski, Michael Bradshaw, and 
Nick Eyre, “Geographies of Energy Transition: Space, Place 
and the Low-carbon Economy”, Energy Policy 53, (2013):  
311–40. 
8 Amar Bhattacharya, Jeremy Oppenheim, and Nicholas 
Stern, Driving Sustainable Development through Better Infrastruc-
ture: Key Elements of a Transformation Program, Global Economy 
and Development Working Papers (July 2015), 5. 
9 Bridge, Bouzarovski, Bradshaw, and Eyre, “Geographies 
of Energy Transition” (see note 7), 331. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Stefan Bouzarovski, Michael Bradshaw, and Alexander 
Wochnik, “Making Territory through Infrastructure: The 
Governance of Natural Gas Transit in Europe”, Geoforum 64 
(2015): 217–28. 
12 Ibid, 217. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Martha M. Roggenkamp et al., “The Role of Networks in 
Changing Energy Markets and the Need for Innovative Solu-
ridors are being carved out, creating new multidimen-
sional ties along technical, physical, operational, regu-
latory, legal and contractual dimensions. We argue in 
the following that the (real and foreseeable) changes 
wrought by infrastructure and new regional orders 
require energy security to be reimagined and the gov-
ernance approaches and toolbox to be adapted. Should 
governance approaches along infrastructure corridors 
or supply chains fail to function smoothly, energy 
security could be challenged and further aggravated 
by uncertainty over future outcomes. We ultimately 
argue that in face of Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” 
initiative, Germany and the EU have to understand 
themselves increasingly as part of the broader emerg-
ing energy macro-region of Euro-Asia. 
In light of this changing landscape, the time is ripe 
for the EU to consolidate its own gravity and “soft” 
power by addressing new energy geographies, the dif-
fusion of political power and fragmentation between 
market orders. To reinvigorate its attractiveness, the 
EU must reconsider how it can serve as a pole of influ-
ence for states in between, particularly given that 
former levers of influence like the acquis communautaire 
and potential EU accession have become less attractive. 
Global Energy Trends 
The world is in the midst of a dramatic energy shift. 
In the Paris Agreement, countries agreed on a new 
climate regime that subsequently has to be translated 
into a radical transformation of the energy system(s) 
and a transition to a new energy paradigm. The en-
suing changes in production, trade and transit, supply 
chain and processing and consumption will create 
new energy geography, which is frequently enabled 
and accelerated by technological revolution. Infra-
structure, the physical framework for energy regions, 
is rapidly developing and changing the energy land-
scape, requiring the EU to (re) position and adapt to 
new topographies and (potentially) an increasingly 
heterogeneous and competitive energy environment. 
Paris Agreement. The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process is 
a global governance mechanism to address climate 
change and provides a framework and annual forum 
for countries to develop work plans and assess pro-
 
tions”, in Energy Networks and the Law: Innovative Solutions in 
Changing Markets, ed. Martha M. Roggenkamp et al. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 417–36 (434). 
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gress. In advance of the COP 21 meeting in Paris, 
nearly all the world’s countries submitted an Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), which 
became the basis of The Paris Agreement, signed by 
over 190 countries and entered into force in Novem-
ber 2016. Even though the INDCs collectively fell short 
of the original targets, they are the foundation for a 
new energy future for which the Agreement provides 
the reference point and targets for a global energy 
transition. The Agreement also shines a spotlight on 
the energy sector, which is responsible for two-thirds 
of global greenhouse gas emissions and thus has to 
carry the major burden of decarbonisation. However, 
while the goals are clear, implementation tools and 
enforcement mechanisms have yet to be identified. 
Given the scale of the global energy transition, the 
needs, whether in technical capacity, finance and in-
vestment, regulatory and policy architecture or tech-
nology and innovation, are enormous. This is neces-
sitating a paradigm shift in investment and changes 
in existing financial structures. Over half of global 
infrastructure financing needs are in the electricity 
sector, and much of this investment is needed in Asia 
for long distance electric grids, among other infra-
structure.15 Policy certainty will be essential to raise 
these funds, while policy uncertainty is a constraint 
for infrastructure developers.16 Meeting the two-
degree target agreed upon in Paris will likely require 
not only sharing best practices and technologies, but 
also optimizing resources across national boundaries. 
Coal. Currently the world’s second largest energy 
source and widely distributed and liberally traded, 
coal consumption will need to peak soon and be re-
placed by other (renewable) resources if the world is 
to meet the Paris commitments. The phase-out of coal 
and replacement with intermittent energy sources is 
a challenge for energy systems, particularly given the 
need for new infrastructure and back-up capacity. 
The balance between domestic coal production and 
imports will likely influence countries’ views of coal’s 
future role in the energy mix and drive different 
energy security narratives and strategies. 
Oil. Oil market dynamics are also changing, as un-
conventional oil production in the US and elsewhere 
has increased supply, lowered prices and created an 
 
15 International Finance Corporation, The World Bank Group, 
Infrastructure Financing Trends, Encompass Quick Take (April 2016), 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/99019f 804c66cfb19e63 
bfd4c83f5107/EMCompass_note05.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
16 Bhattacharya, Oppenheim, and Stern, Driving Sustainable 
Development through Better Infrastructure (see note 8), 13. 
environment in which traditional producers’ (OPEC 
and Russia) influence is seemingly waning. The per-
sistence of relatively low oil prices and a supply sur-
plus has resulted in unprecedented cuts in upstream 
investments.17 Absent a decline in demand, we may 
soon witness another boom and bust cycle of high oil 
price spikes. 
The presence of a climate agreement in the absence 
of a global carbon regime creates uncertainty for future 
oil demand and investment, challenging traditional 
market balancing patterns. Lingering questions about 
oil’s future role in the transport sector amid global 
climate efforts adds further uncertainty in projecting 
demand growth. The pathway to a 2C carbon-neutral 
global economy in 2050 will threaten oil rich com-
panies and countries, their growth models and rent-
seeking patterns. 
For the world to effectively decarbonise, emissions 
need to peak around 2020. In this case, oil rich com-
panies and countries risk of owning stranded re-
sources rather than stranded assets. The geopolitical 
implications are unsettling: if oil revenue dwindles 
and consumption declines, oil regimes may be hard 
pressed to provide the social programmes their popu-
lations are accustomed to, calling into question the 
social contract between rulers and those they rule. 
Many countries in the Middle East, including mem-
bers of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Russia, Kazakh-
stan, Azerbaijan, Algeria and others remain heavily 
reliant on oil revenue to maintain stability and fund 
their budgets. In a world of persistently low or fluc-
tuating oil prices and in light of a potential shift away 
from fossil fuels, such reliance will become increas-
ingly unviable. 
Natural Gas. Natural gas may have the brightest 
energy future among fossil fuels (provided fugitive 
methane emissions are addressed) given its potential 
to serve as a bridge or transition fuel to a sustainable 
energy future. Natural gas has gained on coal in the 
US power sector, while opportunities in midstream and 
downstream gas infrastructure as well as biogas (and 
Carbon Capture, Storage and Usage) are also possible. 
Natural gas trade is becoming increasingly liquid 
and global, weakening the link between LNG prices 
and oil long preserved through oil-indexed contracts. 
This is due to increasing LNG export capacity in Aus-
tralia and elsewhere and the hydraulic fracturing-
enabled resurgence of US hydrocarbon production 
 
17 International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 
2016 (Paris, 2016). 
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and policy changes to facilitate exports. Supply 
increases will likely enable a more fungible natural 
gas market, increase spot pricing, sever the oil price 
linkage and erode price differentials between Asian 
and European markets. In parallel to the LNG revo-
lution, a “pipelinisation” is also taking place in Asia, 
driven by China and India for geostrategic reasons 
to reduce reliance from the Gulf. 
Nuclear. While some European countries are 
moving away from nuclear power, many developing 
countries in the Middle East and Asia increasingly 
view nuclear as a fuel of choice. As countries seek to 
expand energy access while reducing import depend-
encies and emissions, more are considering nuclear 
power. There are over 20 reactors under construction 
in China alone, with 60 reactors under construction 
worldwide18 in South Korea, Russia, India and the 
UAE, among others. China is driving nuclear power 
demand through domestic construction and con-
sumption as well as becoming an exporter of nuclear 
technology, reactor design and expertise. The prolif-
eration of nuclear power raises questions about 
uranium enrichment, safety, environmental impacts 
and the regional security environment. 
Renewables. The renewable energy revolution is real 
and has tremendous implications for energy systems. 
The global average cost of solar PV fell by 61 percent 
between 2009 and 2015, while onshore wind costs 
have declined by an average 14 percent over the same 
period.19 Growth is occurring at an unprecedented 
pace (albeit from a low starting point) compared to 
shifts in energy consumption patterns (e.g. those of 
coal and oil). The BP Energy Outlook predicts total 
installed renewable capacity will triple by 2035,20 
accounting for a third of all power generation growth. 
The IEA’s 2016 World Energy Outlook predicts future 
renewable energy growth will outpace that of other 
energy sources.21 
 
18 International Atomic Energy Agency, accessible at: 
https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/home.aspx. 
19 The Frankfurt School FS-UNEP Collaborating Centre for 
Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance and Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance, Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 
2016, 18–19, http://fs-unep-centre.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/globaltrendsinrenewableenergyinvestment 
2016lowres_0.pdf. 
20 BP Energy Outlook, Outlook to 2035 (2016 Edition), https:// 
www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/energy-
outlook-2016/bp-energy-outlook-2016.pdf. 
21 IEA, 2016 World Energy Outlook (WEO), Executive Summary, 
https://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2016/november/world-
energy-outlook-2016.html. 
This presents opportunities and challenges for 
power system stability and management, and necessi-
tates updates to transmission and distribution systems 
and structural shifts in power system design. As coun-
tries implement their commitments under the Paris 
Agreement, the proliferation of renewables could 
create new “infrastructured” energy spaces, as renew-
ables enable more decentralised and distributed energy 
production while at the same time technological ad-
vances make cross-border regional energy trade in-
creasingly feasible and attractive. The trend toward 
globalisation is not guaranteed, and it is also possible 
that renewable proliferation could lead to “an abrupt 
re-decentralization” of supply.22 
Electricity. Electricity demand will increase in both 
absolute and relative terms23 as a “carbon-neutral” ap-
proach will require electrification across sectors and 
sector coupling. Demand shifts are occurring simul-
taneously with the introduction of new (information) 
technologies and digitalisation, driving changes in 
grid management, market design and the structure 
and operation of energy firms. The energy transition is 
turning conventional wisdom regarding the structure, 
size and profitability of utilities on its head, while 
integrating intermittent renewables requires new grid 
management tools and technologies for manage con-
gestion, reliability and balancing. Amid changes in the 
power sector, decarbonising the transport, heating 
and cooling sectors will require sector coupling, mak-
ing electricity the new “lead energy source” and poten-
tially leading to new grid management strategies, 
including demand-side management and balancing. 
Changes are occurring on a centralised level, as 
illustrated by the challenges in integrating large cen-
tralized wind farms into the power system, as well as 
on a decentralised and distributed level. New electrici-
ty trends enable both distributed or decentralised en-
ergy systems and off-grid solutions, as well as regional 
trade over longer distances, for example through high 
voltage, direct-current (HVDC) power lines that connect 
production and demand centres. This could contribute 
to a globalisation of the energy system as countries 
seek to trade power over longer distances; however, it 
could also lead to a localisation of power, as renewable 
power potential in countries previously lacking re-
sources could reduce the need or desire for expanding 
global energy trade. 
 
22 Indra Øverland, “Energy: The Missing Link in Globaliza-
tion”, Energy Research & Social Science 14 (2016): 122–30 (129). 
23 IEA, WEO 2016 (see note 21). 
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Demand Shifts. The aforementioned demand for 
energy infrastructure in Asia illustrates a broader 
point: rather than OECD countries, non-OECD coun-
tries in Asia will drive our energy future. This change 
is well underway, as China is the world’s largest pro-
ducer and consumer of energy.24 It is also the world’s 
largest CO2 emitter and crucial to any shift to a sus-
tainable energy future. Chinese energy demand has 
driven energy markets over the last decade, and its 
potential transition to a less energy-intensive growth 
path will also affect markets. The IEA predicted in 
its 2015 World Energy Outlook that other non-OECD 
countries, namely India, will become increasingly 
influential in driving energy trends. 
Technology and Digitalisation. Broader changes in 
technology and digitalisation are also affecting the 
energy sector, particularly in the power sector and 
energy efficiency. As with other technological “known 
unknowns” like hydrogen fuel cells, batteries and 
storage, digitalisation could fundamentally change 
the energy system, while demand-side management 
and more “real-life” balancing will require a digital 
revolution. A digitised energy world requires different 
protections, safeguards and methods to guarantee 
system security, and the risks of cyber disruption or 
attack necessitate re-examining the security of critical 
infrastructure. The timing and pace of such changes 
are unknown, as are some of the potential risks, while 
many of the known risks are not always well under-
stood or addressed. The pace of change is also un-
precedented, as the capacity for research, develop-
ment, demonstration, and application has enabled 
swifter and more far-reaching technological change 
and transformation than ever before.25 
Global Energy Cooperation and Governance 
There has been remarkable progress in global energy 
governance in including emerging powers and devel-
oping countries and addressing pertinent energy 
trends in recent years. This includes both efforts to 
 
24 IEA, China’s Engagement in Global Energy Governance, Partner 
Country Series (2016), http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/ 
download/6116041e.pdf?expires=1472460180&id=id&accname=
guest&checksum=550EFB316D2CF6CC48A917FE3FCB284B. 
25 Indra Øverland, “Future Petroleum Geopolitics: Conse-
quences of Climate Policy and Unconventional Oil and Gas”, 
in Handbook of Clean Energy Systems, vol. 6: Sustainability of Energy 
Systems, ed. S. K. Chou et al. (Chichester: Wiley, 2015), chapter 
30, 3517–44 (3519). 
expand membership in traditional organisations to 
include new energy players and to address new energy 
trends. For example, the IEA has developed working 
relationships with non-OECD countries and expanded 
its OECD membership to include new countries. In 
2015, the IEA extended Association Status to China, 
Indonesia and Thailand, and Chile and Mexico are 
membership candidates. The IEA has also expanded its 
traditional focus on oil, gas and fossil fuels to include 
renewables, energy efficiency and energy investment 
in light of the changing energy landscape. 
Other energy governance initiatives responsive 
to current energy trends and inclusive of developing 
countries and emerging powers are the International 
Renewables Agency (IRENA), the Sustainable Energy 
for All (SE4ALL) initiative and the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs), namely Goal Number 7, “Afford-
able and Clean Energy”. Established in 2009, IRENA 
has 149 member countries in all four hemispheres 
with 27 additional states in the accession process. 
SE4ALL is a global initiative launched during the UN’s 
‘Year of Sustainable for Energy for All’ to achieve the 
objectives of universal access to modern energy ser-
vices, doubling the rate of energy efficiency and the 
share of renewable energy in the global energy mix by 
2030. Announced in 2015, the SDGs reinforce commit-
ment to these objectives, as Goal Number 7 calls for 
ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and 
modern energy for all by 2030.26 SE4ALL provides a 
forum and a platform to achieve this goal, including 
advisory committees on energy access, energy effi-
ciency, energy finance and renewable energy. 
The proliferation of energy governance initiatives 
stems in part from the nexus of the energy world 
shifting from OECD to non-OECD countries. China is 
key in driving this shift and, compared to a number 
of years ago, has increasingly taken an active stance 
on global energy governance – or, in their parlance, 
global energy architecture. Currently, China has 
“sought membership in, or established co-operation 
with, 26 entities” engaged in energy governance, in-
dicating a curiosity, if not commitment to, existing 
institutional arrangements.27 China was one of the 
first countries to activate Associate Status at the 2015 
IEA Ministerial and has increased engagement with 
the Energy Charter Treaty, becoming an observer to 
 
26 UN Sustainable Development Goals: http://www.un.org/ 
sustainabledevelopment/energy/. 
27 IEA, China’s Engagement in Global Energy Governance 
(see note 24). 
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the Energy Charter Conference after signing the Inter-
national Energy Charter Declaration in 2015. Chinese 
leadership has also advocated for the G20 as a com-
ponent of the global energy architecture.28 
Much of the impetus in regional or multilateral 
governance, including the formation of organizations, 
economic unions and potential free trade zones, is 
increasingly being driven by Asia. The rise of China 
and the implications for the global energy architec-
ture further underscore the divergent energy trajec-
tories of the EU and the US, two major supporters of 
global energy governance.29 Thanks to unconventional 
energy production, the US, along with Mexico and 
Canada, is increasingly energy self-sufficient, present-
ing a challenge for the transatlantic relationship. The 
different resource profiles of the US and EU contribute 
to different positions on energy trade, potentially com-
plicating questions of how to address energy risks. 
The 2016 US Presidential election and ensuing Trump 
Administration exposed a rift between the US and EU 
and a lack of coherence in the West more broadly. 
In particular, the US President has little appetite for 
global governance and multilateral institutions and 
initiatives (like the Paris Agreement) and has expressed 
a lack of interest in if not disregard for the transatlan-
tic alliance both as an operating principle and forum 
through which to address global challenges. 
Ultimately, Germany and the EU are facing an 
energy landscape in which a coherent Western ap-
proach based on liberal markets and common rules is 
becoming difficult to maintain and in which the rules 
of the game will be increasingly influenced by others 
actors, such as China. This raises questions of which 
rules will govern energy trade and how these rules 
will impact markets and competitiveness. 
Geopolitical Outlook in EU’s Neighbourhood 
Energy is intertwined with hard and human security, 
economic and financial health and environmental 
concerns. Changes in energy reverberate far beyond 
the energy sector, while “changes in political, mili-
tary, diplomatic, and economic policies and strategies 
directly relate to the energy challenges and opportu-
 
28 IEA, China’s Engagement in Global Energy Governance 
(see note 24). 
29 Sybille Röhrkasten and Kirsten Westphal, “Energy Security 
and the Transatlantic Dimension: A View from Germany”, 
Journal of Transatlantic Studies 10, no. 4 (2012), http://www. 
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14794012.2012.734669. 
nities which shape the global energy landscape.” 30 
This is increasingly relevant for Europe as the political 
landscape of the northern hemisphere and the geo-
political dynamics in the European neighbourhood 
threaten stability, prosperity and security in Europe. 
Beyond global governance, the EU’s regional approach 
also requires adaptation. 
Russia has become a major source of concern for 
the EU given its open disregard for liberal values and 
support for illiberal movements intended to create 
dissension. The annexation of Crimea and on-going 
destabilisation in Ukraine have shaken the European 
post-Cold War security order, while Russia’s military 
intervention in Syria has aggravated the rift between 
Moscow and European capitals. For nearly a decade, 
Russia has enlarged its scope for manoeuver and ex-
panded its toolset to include hybrid warfare and other 
military options, strengthening its grip on the post-
Soviet space, projecting power in the Middle East and 
asserting itself as a global player. Given that Russia’s 
power rests on military posture, arms deals and energy 
cooperation, these developments are relevant for ener-
gy security. The paradox is that the former “indispen-
sable” 31 energy superpower has lost some of its market 
power in the wake of the shale revolution, while efforts 
to engage in energy cooperation (like in the Eurasian 
Economic Union) and align with OPEC could partially 
restore this power. 
Spheres of influence in the EU and Russia’s com-
mon neighbourhood overlap. As envisioned in the 
early 2000s, the EU neighbourhood encompassed the 
former COMECON and post-Soviet countries to the 
east, as well as Turkey and North Africa with the aim 
of expanding and exporting stability and prosperity. 
The EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
covered 16 eastern and southern neighbouring coun-
tries, and aimed at achieving “the closest possible 
political association and the greatest possible degree 
of economic integration”.32 Bilateral policies were 
accompanied by multilateral initiatives like the East-
ern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean and 
the Black Sea Initiative. The Energy Community, estab-
 
30 Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “The Entanglement of Energy, 
Grand Strategy, and International Security”, in The Handbook 
of Global Energy Policy, ed. Andreas Goldthau (Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), chapter 2, 30–47 (43). 
31 Fiona Hill, Energy Empire: Oil, Gas and Russia’s Revival 
(London: Foreign Policy Centre, September 2004), 27 ff. 
32 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en 
(accessed 15 December 2016). 
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lished in 2006, originally focused on the Balkans and 
later expanded to include Moldova and Ukraine (see 
Map Energy Regions) (see next Chapter), while Turkey 
was an observer from the outset. This architecture was 
intended to establish a “ring of friends” and attract 
countries seeking close relations with the EU. How-
ever, this “ring of friends” is slowly turning into a 
“ring of fire”, as geopolitical turbulence has come 
closer to European borders. Given the (re-)emergence 
of powers like Russia and China, most countries are 
pursuing a balancing ‘multi-vector’ strategy rather 
than aligning solely with one actor. This has exposed 
the ENP’s limitations in projecting stability within 
and beyond its borders and highlighted the short-
comings of the EU’s external governance and regional 
crisis management. 
Meanwhile, turmoil in the Middle East and North 
Africa stemming from leadership transitions, civil 
war, demographic challenges, migration and insur-
gency threatens to erode existing borders in a region 
crucial for EU energy supply. Libya has been torn apart 
by civil war, while security in Algeria and Egypt, the 
region’s largest and most populous countries, is pre-
carious. These countries are important anchors of 
stability for the EU when it comes to energy as well 
as migration. 
Straddling the Middle East and Europe, Turkey is 
actively working to establish itself as an energy cross-
roads and achieve its foreign policy goal of becoming a 
gas hub. Having realised EU membership is unlikely to 
be attained, Turkey seeks to exercise influence based 
on its strategic geopolitical position between an energy-
hungry Europe and energy-rich regions to the east and 
south. However, Turkey’s energy policy is driven by 
geopolitics and domestic power struggles, making it 
a volatile partner. Turkey also has a complicated rela-
tionship with Russia, due in part to diverging interests 
in Syria and Crimea. However, both countries appear 
to be seeking a rapprochement in which energy – in-
cluding nuclear power – is a vehicle for cooperation. 
Turkey’s role as a transit country or gas hub depends 
on a delicate balance of interests with Russia in the 
Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Levant, and potential 
gas supplies via Turkey from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan require Russian benevolence as it 
can jeopardise gas trade. 
Energy is also a substantial lever of cooperation 
between Iran and Russia, who have established close 
energy ties based on nuclear technology even while 
competing over oil (and potentially gas) market 
shares. This competition could become more pro-
nounced as Iran hopes to restore and ramp up oil pro-
duction and export natural gas (mostly via pipeline 
to Iraq and as LNG to global markets). However, while 
sanctions were lifted following the Nuclear Agreement 
and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 
renewed tensions with the US under the Trump Ad-
ministration cannot be ruled out. These relationships, 
while mostly bilateral, have far-reaching consequences 
for the regional energy landscape, particularly in the 
Caspian Sea and Caucasus region where a north-south 
transport corridor could link Iran and Russia via the 
Caucasian countries and both are interested in block-
ing a potential Trans Caspian gas pipeline. Similar 
dynamics and uncertainties could have a destabilizing 
impact on North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean 
and the Caspian region, with implications for Europe. 
Major energy discoveries are also shaping the 
Eastern Mediterranean region and could serve as an 
impetus for negotiation and resolution of the long-
standing division of Cyprus and cooperation in find-
ing export markets. However, the on-going tension 
with Turkey, the sole supporter of the so-called Turk-
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus, will need to be 
resolved for gas to be exported, while the absence of a 
political settlement could undermine the commercial 
viability of offshore gas development. Offshore devel-
opment in Israel is similarly fraught with (geo-)politi-
cal obstacles and the need to secure export markets, 
while Egypt is currently the focus of investment by 
international firms BP and Eni. 
The hydrocarbon-rich Arctic is another area of 
potential tension in the European neighbourhood. 
While the cooperative pre-2014 geopolitical environ-
ment enabled hydrocarbon exploration activities, this 
is no longer the case. Under pressure from US and EU 
sanctions and falling oil prices, Russian Artic offshore 
production has faltered, and China’s increased focus 
on the region as part of its Maritime Silk Road has 
heightened Russian sensitivities to its coastal waters 
and Arctic economic zone. These dynamics have con-
tributed to rising militarisation in the Artic over the 
past two years.33 Nevertheless, a set of inclusive gov-
ernance mechanisms between the Arctic littoral states 
does exist, distinguishing it from geopolitical tensions 
afflicting other regions. 
Perhaps one of the biggest geoeconomic shifts (and 
potential causes of geopolitical tension) in the EU’s 
 
33 Maria Morgunova and Kirsten Westphal, Offshore Hydro-
carbon Resources in the Arctic, SWP Research Paper 3/2016 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2016). 
Infrastructure Corridors, Energy Geographies and Fragmented Orders 
SWP Berlin 
European Energy Security Reimagined 
March 2017 
 
 
 
15 
neighbourhood is China’s emergence and engagement 
across Central Asia and the Middle East to Europe 
under the 1 plus 16 framework. While Chinese influ-
ence is not new, China’s struggle with weakening 
growth and massive overcapacity is, as is its active 
engagement with institutions, organisations and 
countries in its regional orbit. Given that China is an 
influential actor in its own right and also a primary 
reference point for other actors, its desire to cultivate 
ties with other countries and regions could further 
alter the Eurasian geopolitical landscape. Central 
Asian countries could choose partnership with China 
as a bulwark against Russia or attempt to balance the 
influence of the two along with the EU. 
Amid these shifts in energy and geopolitics, the EU is 
struggling to take coherent foreign policy action and 
formulate a cohesive response. Its attractiveness as a 
zone of stability and prosperity is shrinking, while the 
ability to use EU Accession as a means of influence is 
also declining as the “carrot” of membership loses its 
lustre. Subsequently, the EU’s ability to export rules 
and norms is increasingly under strain, threatening 
its soft power. Russia and China also offer alternative 
economic and development models that might be more 
attractive for some political leaders in the neighbour-
hood. 
Infrastructure Corridors, Energy Geographies 
and Fragmented Orders 
The multipolar world in energy, political and eco-
nomic relations is taking shape. These shifts are not 
only an opportunity for the EU to exert influence as a 
new ‘pole’ but also a wakeup call for the EU to formu-
late a more strategic approach. The potential emer-
gence of new energy corridors, particularly via China’s 
externally focused economic and energy activities, 
could challenge the EU’s competitiveness and ability 
to shape the standards and patterns of trade, tech-
nology and exchange in the wider neighbourhood. 
The outward extension of China’s economic am-
bitions through the One Belt, One Road initiative, 
comprised of maritime and overland corridors, is a 
key development. The project, announced in 2013, 
includes a land-based Silk Road Economic “Belt” 
through Eurasia, through which China could export 
its vision for infrastructure and economic activity, 
positioning itself as the “Middle Kingdom” at the 
centre of the proposal while competing with the EU 
by shaping new infrastructure and geopolitical geog-
raphies. Through a corridor approach, China is at-
tempting to project its development model outward 
by transposing it geographically into areas traditionally 
considered Russia’s backyard and onward into Europe. 
As Europe continues to progress toward the internal 
energy market, Central Asian countries are increasingly 
exporting their energy resources to China and looking 
eastward for investment. 
These corridors can be perceived as inroads for 
operational, technical, contractual and commercial 
arrangements that may develop into energy regions 
and/or regional markets in the future. These infra-
structure geographies go hand in hand with develop-
ing physical flows, operational modes, technical norms, 
regulatory rules and contractual arrangements. These 
corridors can also encompass multiple production 
chains, including the connection between up-, mid- 
and downstream activities and factories, facilities, and 
plants, thus carving out energy geographies and estab-
lishing socio-economic ties.34 This can be understood 
as energy regionalisation from below. 
According to a spring 2015 OBOR action plan, 
while the project’s guiding principles are economic 
and infrastructure integration, energy security, energy 
infrastructure investment and connectivity are key 
focus areas.35 Infrastructure projects will be pursued 
through bilateral and regional agreements and financed 
by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
which, according to Chinese President Xi Jinping, 
was founded to “channel more resources, particularly 
private investment, into infrastructure projects to 
promote regional connectivity and economic integra-
tion” 36 along with the New Development Bank and 
Silk Road Infrastructure Fund. The AIIB, whose invest-
ments will shape the physical landscape, released a 
draft energy strategy identifying the promotion of 
 
34 See also Margarita Balmaceda and Kirsten Westphal, Cross-
Regional Production Chains, Regional Fault Lines and Competitive 
Regional Processes in Euro-Asia, ISA Conference Paper, February 
2017. 
35 Full Text: “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Belt and 
Road”, Xinhua News Agency, 28 March 2015, accessible: http:// 
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-03/28/c_134105858. 
htm. 
36 Council on Foreign Relations, “Remarks by Chinese Presi-
dent Xi at the Inauguration of the Asian Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank”, published 16 January 2016, accessible: http:// 
www.cfr.org/infrastructure/remarks-chinese-president-xi-
inauguration-asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/p37470. 
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regional cooperation and improvement energy access 
and reliability while maintaining growth as goals.37 
OBOR demonstrates that as energy corridors devel-
op they may cut across existing jurisdictions, necessi-
tating a rethinking along these lines. This is increas-
ingly evident when considering the integrated natural 
gas infrastructure constructed over the past decades 
by the Soviet Union/Russia and European countries. 
This infrastructure geography of ‘longue durée’ has 
outlasted the Cold War, countries and political sys-
tems and, in crisscrossing Europe’s new borders and 
regional fault lines, creates its own ‘ecology’ and 
topography.38 The electricity network infrastructure 
established prior to the fall of the Soviet Union also 
created a network architecture that no longer mirrors 
the political landscape. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
are connected to the Soviet-era BRELL power system, 
highlighting that electricity networks do not neces-
sarily follow the contours of politics or newly formed 
economic blocs. Synchronization with the European 
system is under discussion, a development that would 
have severe implication for Belarus, Russia and the 
Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The same is also true 
for Ukraine, where synchronization with the EU 
would raise geopolitical and security issues regarding 
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. 
Against the backdrop of the energy infrastructure 
geography, a proliferation of energy market and politi-
cal orders is occurring (see next chapter) and region-
alism is being shaped from above.39 However, these 
processes and their spatial realm do not necessarily 
coincide. Yafimava has conceptualised four spaces: a 
space of flows, a space of places, a contractual space, 
and a legal/regulatory space.40 In her focus on the EU 
transit dimension, she highlights that these spaces 
do not match. Specifically, there is a high level of dis-
continuity between and within the four spaces,41 
 
37 The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Issue Note for 
Discussion, AIIB Energy Strategy: Sustainable Energy for Asia (Octo-
ber 2016), accessible: http://euweb.aiib.org/uploadfile/2016/ 
1013/20161013092936280.pdf. 
38 Per Högselius, Red Gas. Russia and the Origins of European 
Energy Dependence (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 
234/235. 
39 This view is informed by the intensive debates during the 
“Workshop on Energy Issues from the Comparative Regional-
ism Perspective” organized by Kathleen J. Hancock in Berlin, 
27–29 April 2016. Grateful thanks to all the participants. 
40 Katja Yafimava, The Transit Dimension of EU Energy Security 
(Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2011), 32–39. 
41 Ibid., 37. 
the arenas of energy and financial flows, nation states 
(places), spaces governed by short and long-term con-
tractual relations and legal/regulatory spaces.42 
The different (emerging) regional market orders 
could lead to fragmentation, gaps and overlaps as 
countries find themselves in between or left out and 
the boundaries of different regimes collide, while 
fragmentation increases uncertainty about actors’ 
behaviour and raises transaction costs. With these 
developments comes the potential for new orders 
dominated by new actors and, potentially, new rules 
tailored to particular interests and mercantilist 
mechanisms. The rules of the game are far from cer-
tain, and cooperation between states with authoritar-
ian regimes and a state-dominated energy sector may 
well limit the EU’s influence and economic activities. 
While Europe continues to look to the Caspian coun-
tries as playing a key role in its energy future, this 
requires increasing interconnection and investment in 
infrastructure hardware and legal and regulatory soft-
ware to enable transit, trade and exchange, to ensure 
the EU remains competitive in this economic space. 
This challenges the EU’s competitiveness and its role 
as a purveyor of rules and norms and signals a new 
level of competition that requires a strategic European 
approach to infrastructure, innovation and technology. 
Energy Regions, Market Orders and 
Competitive Regionalism 
The confluence of these developments come at a criti-
cal time for the EU, beset by internal issues, mired in 
crisis management and facing governance fatigue and 
limits to its legal and regulatory power. The EU has 
built an identity and competence around exporting 
norms and the rule of law and has tried to establish a 
set of rules in the energy sector considered crucial for 
liberalization and fostering energy market competi-
tion. The EU exports the legal framework enshrined 
in the acquis communautaire to the Neighbourhood and 
the Energy Community, and EU energy law constitutes 
supranational law, largely distinguishing it from do-
mestic energy laws in other countries.43 However, the 
EU’s approach to the Neighbourhood has in part con-
tributed to the discontinuity of the four energy spaces 
 
42 Ibid. 
43 Kim Talus, “Internationalization of Energy Law”, in 
Research Handbook on International Energy Law, ed. Kim Talus 
(Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 
2015), 3–17 (12). 
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as it unilaterally imposed new institutions that fun-
damentally transformed the energy sector.44 
The Energy Community disseminates the acquis 
communautaire, which applies to EU member states, 
members of the European Economic Area (EEA) and 
the Energy Community. The Energy Community is 
essentially the promotion of EU energy law beyond 
the EU border, intended to bring the countries in 
Southern Europe and the Black Sea Region closer to 
the EU energy market. There are eight contracting 
parties: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine and 
four observers: Armenia, Georgia, Norway and Turkey. 
Negotiations for Georgian membership are on-going 
and Armenia was invited to join in 2016. 
As the EU projects the reach of the acquis outward, 
limits to external energy governance become more 
evident, and the degree of implementation among 
Energy Community member countries is varied as 
countries liberalize at different speeds. The process 
of transcribing the acquis, unlike the Energy Charter 
or other multilateral energy initiatives, requires coun-
tries to change their domestic laws and essentially 
transpose EU laws into domestic legislation without a 
say in the development or substance of the laws them-
selves. The adoption of the legal code is just the first 
step in a long and difficult implementation process 
that requires the fundamental transformation of the 
energy system and sector. This process of making 
domestic changes in accordance with EU law regard-
less of the energy situation is difficult in countries 
where necessary preconditions for a market and the 
accompanying hardware do not exist. These challenges 
are evident in the Balkans, where Bosnia and Macedo-
nia are behind in implementing the Third Energy 
Package and Ukraine is the real test case. Moreover, 
the carrot of accession, a staple of the EU’s normative 
soft power and the outward reach of the acquis in the 
Neighbourhood, is no longer an incentive for either 
side. Countries on the Eurasian landmass are striving 
to balance the influence of Russia, China, the EU and 
even the US, while Turkey and Iran are also active 
players. 
Many countries are also increasingly caught between 
the Energy Community and the Russian-led Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU). Moldova and Ukraine are both 
 
44 See in detail: Kirsten Westphal, “Institutional Change in 
European Natural Gas Markets and Implications for Energy 
Security: Lessons from the German Case”, Energy Policy 74 
(2014): 35–43. 
Energy Community Member States and chose not to 
join the EEU despite being transit states for Russian 
gas. Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic Union in 
2015 after deciding not to sign an Association Agree-
ment with the EU, while Energy Community observer 
Georgia, along with Moldova, signed an Association 
Agreement with the EU in 2014 and declined to join 
the EEU. 
The Eurasian Economic Union was founded by the 
Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union in 2014. The 
project is a creation of the Russia Federation; other 
members include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. The creation of the EEU essentially estab-
lishes a second economic bloc in largely the same 
neighbourhood. This raises questions of whether coun-
tries should choose membership in one bloc versus the 
other, if simultaneous membership could be compat-
ible and how countries belonging to neither are dealt 
with. The common EEU electricity market is due to be 
realized by 2019 and concepts for oil and gas are to 
beimplemented in stages by 2024 and 2025 respective-
ly. The draft programs are based on existing (partly 
Soviet-era) infrastructure, and progress in integrating 
energy markets will require dismantling commercial 
and regulatory barriers. The plans for the electricity 
market are the most advanced with a proposed elec-
tronic trading and information exchange system.45 In-
terestingly, the European continental electricity market 
is the model for the EEU’s common electricity market.46 
Russia is also a member of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization (SCO) established in 2001 as a secu-
rity organization based on a shared interest in battling 
“terrorism, extremism, and separatism”.47 The SCO was 
created to foster trust and cooperation among mem-
bers in many areas, including energy, and has since 
undertaken efforts to create a common Eurasian eco-
nomic space and counter Western influence. The 
group, comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan, 
 
45 “The EEC Board approved the program for the formation 
of a common electricity market of the Union and the Main 
directions of coordinated (agreed) transport policy of the 
EAEU”, 26 October 2016, accessible: http://www.eurasian 
commission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/27-10-2016-1.aspx (ac-
cessed 13 March 2017). 
46 Kirsten Westphal and Maria Pastukhova, A Common Energy 
Market in the Eurasian Economic Union, SWP Comments 9/2016 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2016). 
47 The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism 
and Extremism, signed in Shanghai, 15 June 2001, accessible: 
http://eurasiangroup.org/files/documents/conventions_eng/ 
The_20Shanghai_20Convention.pdf. 
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has plans to establish a free trade zone in products, 
capital, technology and services by 2020, sparking 
speculation that its economic impact could be more 
substantial than the original security purpose. Presi-
dent Putin formally proposed the creation of an 
Energy Club in 2006, agreed to by SCO energy minis-
ters to “form a unified regional energy space”.48 The 
SCO Energy Charter focuses on infrastructure con-
struction, development of energy transportation, 
financing of joint and multilateral energy projects 
and research and development cooperation focused 
on technology.49 The Energy Club includes members 
of the governmental, business, scientific and research 
communities in each country. 
As its membership includes energy producers and 
consumers, the Energy Club’s significance could be 
substantial, but diverging interests between energy-
producing and energy-consuming members also illus-
trates that energy concerns can be at odds with the 
alignments of regional groupings. Many energy deals 
between SCO members, like the Central Asia-China 
gas pipeline, occur outside the SCO framework and 
China’s increasing interest in Central Asia puts it 
squarely in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. 
That said, OBOR provides an alternative to the EU 
as well as needed investment. 
The possibility of cooperation between regional 
initiatives, namely OBOR and the EEU, holds real 
potential for further energy integration in Eurasia. 
There are reports that the EEU and SCO are working 
on approaches to a “continental economic partner-
ship”,50 while an agreement to synthesize the EEU’s 
efforts with OBOR’s overland economic belt was 
signed during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s May 2015 
visit to Moscow. The joint declaration between China 
and Russia discussed the integration of EEU and Silk 
Road Economic Belt projects in the hopes of creating 
a common Eurasian economic space.51 In May 2015, 
 
48 Sreemati Gangult, “The SCO: An Energy Alliance in the 
Making”, in The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian 
Geopolitics: New Directions, Perspectives, and Challenges, ed. Michael 
Fredholm (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2013), 279, accessible: 
https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:876570/ 
FULLTEXT01.pdf. 
49 Ibid. 
50 “EEU, SCO Preparing ‘Most Ambitious Trade Agreement’”, 
Russia & India Report, 3 March 2016, accessible: https://in.rbth. 
com/economics/finance/2016/03/03/eeu-sco-preparing-most-
ambitious-trade-agreement_572685. 
51 “Joint Statement on Cooperation on the Construction of 
Join Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Projects”, 
Moscow and Beijing signed a joint declaration that 
effectively discussed the integration of projects between 
the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt in the hopes of creating a common 
economic space across Eurasia.52 The focus on inter-
national cooperation and connectivity underscores 
the degree to which China’s plans could change the 
physical and political landscapes, as infrastructure 
constructed to facilitate trade could create longstand-
ing ties, resulting in “infrastructure geographies” and 
energy regions that could reorient energy trade and 
exert influence beyond geoeconomics to geopolitics. 
These “energy regions” are formed and driven both by 
old hegemons and new powers. In any case, Russia and 
China are shaping a flexible energy architecture sub-
stantiated by interconnections and infrastructure, 
which could potentially evolve into an energy region 
with harmonized rules and norms. 
The EU and China included OBOR as a new dimen-
sion to their Strategic Partnership at the 2015 EU-China 
Summit53 and developed further into the EU-China 
Connectivity Platform in 2016.54 Given mutual inter-
ests in increasing connectivity, particularly through 
energy infrastructure in Central Asia, there is poten-
tial for fruitful cooperation. However, this largely 
depends on whether China chooses to play by existing 
liberal rules or write its own. The role of state-owned 
Chinese firms and their investments in strategic infra-
structure pose questions as to whether there is a level 
playing field, and whether these companies will serve 
as tools of China’s geoeconomic power and serve mer-
cantilist versus market interests. While OBOR pro-
motes policy coordination between participants, there 
are few details on specific instruments, areas for co-
operation and sets of rules. 
The confluence of macro trends, such as new infra-
structure initiatives, the energy transition and the 
 
8 May 2015 accessible at: http://beltandroad.hktdc.com/en/ 
official-documents/Details.aspx?ID=470819. 
52 “Joint Statement on Cooperation on the Construction of 
Joint Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Projects”, 
accessible: http://beltandroad.hktdc.com/en/official-documents/ 
Details.aspx?ID=470819. 
53 EU-China Joint Statement, “The Way Forward after Forty 
Years of EU-China Cooperation”, 29 June 2015, accessible: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/ 
2015/06/29-eu-china-statement/. 
54 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/themes/ 
international/european_neighbourhood_policy/european_ 
eastern_partnership/doc/tenth-eastern-partnership-transport-
panel/eu-china_connectivity_platform_by_dg_move.pdf 
(accessed 6 December 2016). 
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search for new growth models is shaping (energy) 
geographies. Despite the Paris Agreement there is also 
a lack of consensus on what the desired final stage of 
an energy transition looks like,55 making the hetero-
geneity of energy regions a possibility should indivi-
dual pathways become competitive attempts to devel-
op the winning growth model, technologies and solu-
tions. Moreover, the lack of formal enforcement makes 
adherence to the Paris Agreement far from certain, 
enabling countries to prioritise short-term goals like 
energy security and competitiveness in response to 
domestic political or social pressure, while other coun-
tries may continue to adhere to their Paris commit-
ments. Such a divergence of efforts and priorities could 
cause dissension and rivalry among major powers56 
and result in competitive regionalism and even an 
‘energy bloc’ construction. 
 
 
 
55 Bridge, Bouzarovski, Bradshaw, and Eyre, “Geographies 
of Energy Transition” (see note 7), 332. 
56 See Statoil, Energy Perspectives 2016. Long-term Macro and 
Market Outlook (Oslo, 2016); World Energy Council, World 
Energy Scenarios 2016 – The Grand Transition (London, October 
2016), https://www.worldenergy.org/publications/2016/world-
energy-scenarios-2016-the-grand-transition/ (accessed 21 De-
cember 2016). 
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Surveying and Addressing Energy Risks and Opportunities 
 
Given the potential for countries and regions to grow 
increasingly interconnected and geography to shift, 
energy uncertainty is at the heart of current and future 
risks. The repositioning of actors and reconfiguration 
of markets and spaces creates uncertainty, and shift-
ing geographies could challenge the needs of the en-
ergy transition, namely investments in system mod-
ernization, improvements in poor interconnections 
and enhancement of connectivity. The globalisation 
of the energy system is also not necessarily guaran-
teed. While the identified shifts and trends have the 
potential to bring a continent closer together, they 
also could create new fractures and increase the like-
lihood and impact of energy risks.57 Following an 
identification of energy risks in the EU’s neighbour-
hood and an analysis of their scope, variety and preva-
lence, several preliminary conclusions can be drawn:58 
1. Natural gas trade via pipeline, followed by elec-
tricity trade, is most commonly associated with 
conflict. 
2. Energy flows crossing multiple borders, jurisdic-
tions, conflict zones or disputed areas are often a 
source of tension. 
3. Energy risks can be found along the fault lines 
of divergent regimes, be they regulatory, legal or 
contractual. 
4. Rapid changes or major transitions in energy mar-
kets, price levels and policy framework can cause 
tension and uncertainty. 
These conclusions demonstrate that energy-related 
risks stem in part from cross-border resource trade in 
a globalising world. As energy resources are widely 
distributed and the location of resources and demand 
centres may be different, the very nature of energy 
 
57 This is supported by a data collection effort conducted by 
the authors in partnership with Indra Øverland and the Cen-
tral Asia Data-Gathering Team (CADGAT) of the OSCE Academy 
in February/March 2016, to whom we owe many thanks. 
58 In a preliminary publication (Indra Øverland, Ellen Scholl, 
Kirsten Westphal and Katja Yafimava, Energy Security and the 
OSCE. The Case for Energy Risk Mitigation and Connectivity, SWP 
Comments 26/2016 [Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
February 2016]), several conclusions were highlighted and 
worth including here. We thank co-authors Indra Øverland 
and Katja Yafimava for their contributions to the initial 
publication. 
production, consumption and trade is at the root of 
these conflicts. Should the above-described global 
energy trends drive increases in connectivity and 
global energy trade, energy risks along regulatory 
fault lines and overlapping energy orders have the 
potential to increase. 
The prevalence of current risks related to explora-
tion, production and transmission further emphasises 
the transboundary nature of these challenges and the 
potential for discrete risks to have a larger impact on 
global energy supply. Risks to one link in the energy 
process can have a ripple effect down the supply chain. 
In the current system where producers rely on con-
sumers and vice versa and both rely on transit, stable 
relationships, secure infrastructure and governance 
tools and solutions to mitigate these risks are crucial. 
This is particularly relevant given the increasingly 
complex landscape of regional blocs, economic areas 
and institutions with an interest in energy. Change 
creates uncertainty and can increase the unpredicta-
bility of actors’ behaviour, giving rise to misunder-
standings, misperceptions and mistrust. This can also 
reinforce isolationism, self-interest, localisation and 
neo-mercantilism, all of which contradict the economic 
rationale to explore economies of scale, competitive 
advantages and geographical conditions. The possibil-
ity for the globalising trend in energy to reverse and 
for countries to revert to more nationally-based energy 
systems is enabled by the low cost and increasing pro-
liferation of renewable energy, more widely distributed 
and locally available than traditional fossil fuels. Thus, 
rising energy insecurity could be on the horizon. 
These risks, broadly conceptualised as hard, soft 
and environmental risks, are explained in the follow-
ing sections. Europe will have to adapt to this diverse 
energy risk landscape, which includes traditional hard 
security risks along with ‘soft’ risks related to politi-
cal, social and economic conditions, and environmen-
tal hazards (see Table 1). 
Hard Energy Security Risks 
Many energy risks, including threats to energy infra-
structure and the role of energy in (hybrid) warfare, 
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Table 1 
Selected Examples of Energy Risks 
Category Selected Case Samples 
Hard  December 2015 Cyber Attack on 
Ukrainian Power Grid 
 Pipeline Attacks in Turkey by Non-
State Actors 
 Eastern Ukraine Conflict over 
Resources 
Soft  EU-Eurasia Economic Bloc Com-
petition 
 Disputes over Cyprus EEZ and 
Offshore and Relevance for Natural 
Gas Discoveries 
 Disputed Caspian Sea Status 
Environmental  Energy and Water Issues Related 
to Construction of Rogun Dam 
(Tajikistan) 
 Environmental and Safety Risks of 
Aging/Ageing Nuclear Plants 
 Competing Water Use in Central  
Asia (Electricity, Water Supply, 
Agriculture) 
 
are relevant for hard security as their realization can 
cause physical supply disruptions. These risks are criti-
cal in terms of probability and impact and while many 
are already present, their relevance and prevalence is 
likely to grow. 
Perhaps the most easily understood and readily 
apparent risks relate to the security of critical infra-
structure. While not a new problem, infrastructure 
security has come to the fore as the energy system 
becomes more interconnected and digitally operated. 
Amid expanding global energy trade, “energy volumes 
increasingly transit through critical land and sea 
routes”.59 This raises the profile and importance of 
the physical security of energy, whether in extraction, 
production or transport, and requires thinking beyond 
security of supply to security of supply chains.60 It also 
raises questions of responsibility for protecting physi-
 
59 Mesul Hakki Casin, “Critical Infrastructures: Security and 
Energy Politics in the Eastern Mediterranean Region and the 
Role of the OSCE”, in The OSCE’s Contribution to Energy Govern-
ance in the Mediterranean Region, ed. Silvia Colombo and Nicolò 
Sartori (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali [IAI], New-Med 
Research Network, April 2016), chapter 2, 33, accessible: 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/newmed_energy.pdf. 
60 Ibid. 
cal infrastructure that may span hundreds or thou-
sands of kilometres and how to accomplish this. 
Energy system infrastructure is an attractive and 
often accessible target for a range of actors. For non-
state actors (including terrorists), energy infrastruc-
ture attacks can be a means to an end: to garner atten-
tion, strike at a regime or inhibit a country of com-
pany’s ability to produce energy (and obtain revenue). 
Energy infrastructure has been attacked in on-going 
conflicts as both direct target and collateral damage. 
These risks are relevant across fuel types and supply 
chain segments and are most salient for electricity, oil 
and natural gas. 
An attack or breach on one link can disrupt the 
entire supply chain and consequences can extend well 
beyond the initial target, with second and third order 
effects on safety, human security and the environment. 
In case of an electricity outage, risk cascades can also 
affect food and water supply. Attacks on nuclear facil-
ities could have devastating consequences and the nu-
clear fuel chain requires particular attention. 
In addition to direct physical threats, digitally 
mediated threats are increasingly a key concern. 
Cyber-attacks on energy infrastructure can be con-
ducted by targeting Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, tampering with the 
digital management of electric grids and power sta-
tions, wreaking havoc as severe as, if not worse than, 
physical attacks. The potential impact on the energy 
sector was demonstrated by the first widely publicised 
cyber-attack to take down a power grid, if only tem-
porarily, in Ukraine in December 2015. Other relevant 
cyber-attacks include the attack on Iranian nuclear 
facilities termed Stuxnet and the infiltration of the 
Saudi Aramco computer system with the Shamoon 
virus. The possibility of virtual attack poses significant 
challenges for infrastructure protection and harden-
ing, including complicated questions of attribution, 
information sharing and response. 
The World Energy Council has raised awareness 
of the threat posed by digital risks on energy system 
resilience, noting in a 2016 report that cyber risk is 
perceived as a potential threat to business continuity 
and “among the top concerns for energy leaders”.61 
The report notes the need for (and absence of) cross-
sector collaboration, information sharing and the 
 
61 World Energy Perspectives 2016. The Road to Resilience, Managing 
Cyber Risks (London, World Energy Council, 2016), Executive 
Summary, accessible: https://www.worldenergy.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/09/Resilience_Managing-cyber-risks_ Exec-
summary.pdf. 
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development and dissemination of best practices and 
international cyber security standards, and encour-
ages governments to support information sharing 
across countries, sectors and within industry and 
improve international cooperation on cyber security 
frameworks. 
The EU Programme for European Critical Energy 
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) was established in 
2006 and expanded in 2013 to include the EU electric 
grid and gas transmission network. The programme 
was designed to identify, designate and assess critical 
infrastructure in the EU, create a Critical Infrastruc-
ture Warning Information Network, fund critical 
infrastructure protection projects and promote an 
external dimension via cooperation with the Euro-
pean Economic Area and European Free Trade Area.62 
This program goes beyond energy infrastructure, 
focusing on interrelationships between different sys-
tems and “interdependencies” between sectors and 
states – an important element the Commission noted 
was previously lacking in infrastructure protection 
efforts.63 The program’s obvious geographic limita-
tions are problematic given the EU’s reliance on energy 
imports and transportation infrastructure originating 
and crossing through regions outside the EU. 
Several international institutions have a hand – or 
at least an interest – in critical energy infrastructure 
protection. Following the 2008 Bucharest Convention, 
NATO assumed a formal energy security role and sup-
ports the protection of critical energy infrastructure 
as part of its mission.64 Much of NATO’s efforts have 
focused on raising awareness and supporting educa-
tion and consultation.65 According to NATO’s energy 
security agenda, “sharing best practices on the pro-
tection of critical energy infrastructure remains 
NATO’s most frequently offered cooperation item with 
 
62 Accessible: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/ 
infrastructure/protection-critical-infrastructure. 
63 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document 
on a New Approach to the European Programme for Critical Infra-
structure Protection, Making European Critical Infrastructure More 
Secure (Brussels, 28 August 2013), accessible: http://ec.europa. 
eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20130828_epcip_ 
commission_staff_working_document.pdf. 
64 Accessible: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_ 
49208.htm 
65 Alessandro Niglia, “Critical Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) 
with a Focus on Energy Security”, in The Protection of Critical 
Energy Infrastructure against Emerging Security Challenges, ed. Ales-
sandro Niglia (Amsterdam et al.: IOS Press, 2015), 5–15 (12). 
partner countries with respect to energy security”.66 
Despite these activities, the prevailing wisdom at 
NATO is that “protecting energy infrastructure is, 
however, primarily a national responsibility”.67 
The OSCE has been particularly active in raising 
awareness of and sharing best practices to mitigate 
the cyber threat to critical energy infrastructure. The 
OSCE has conducted cyber simulations and training 
and produced ‘The Good Practices Guide on Non-
Nuclear Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection 
(NNCEIP)’ from Terrorist Attacks Focusing on Threats 
Emanating from Cyberspace.68 While the report is 
proactive in addressing future energy system chal-
lenges stemming from interconnection and digiti-
zation, hurdles remain, particularly in facilitating 
information exchange and developing tools to miti-
gate and respond to cyber intrusion and manage 
potential cascading effects. 
While the publication of a guide to raise awareness, 
identify threats and convey common best practices and 
strategies to policymakers is an important step, the 
lack of coordination mechanisms or information shar-
ing platforms relegates efforts to the national level, 
despite the cross-border nature of energy infrastruc-
ture and need for coordination. As the Good Practices 
Guide points out, “exchanging this data, especially 
across national borders, quickly leads to legal issues 
with respect to privacy and data protection”.69 The 
report concludes, “there is a need for the complex 
international legal material to be reworked, including 
explicit regulations stating requirements in relation 
to the energy industry”.70 
Perhaps the biggest gap in infrastructure protection 
is crisis management following an attack, whether 
physical or virtual. In such attacks, particularly ones 
with cross-border impacts, there is no standing body 
to serve as neutral arbiter and restore energy flows. 
However, given the growing use of cyber as a tool by 
nation states, it is questionable whether the lack of an 
 
66 Julijus Grubliauskas, “NATO’s Energy Security Agenda”, 
NATO Review Magazine, accessible: http://www.nato.int/docu/ 
review/2014/NATO-Energy-security-running-on-empty/NATO-
energy-security-agenda/EN/index.htm. 
67 Accessible: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_ 
49208.htm. 
68 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, “The Good Practices Guide on Non-Nuclear Critical 
Energy Infrastructure Protection (NNCEIP)”, in Terrorist Attacks 
Focusing on Threats Emerging from Cyberspace (2013), accessible: 
http://www.osce.org/atu/103500?download=true. 
69 Ibid., 62. 
70 Ibid. 
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international response team (at present, response to 
international events has been mounted by US CERT 
teams) this will remain viable. Considering the issue’s 
sensitivity and political prominence and the difficulty 
in attributing culpability, international cooperation 
between the US, China, Russia and the EU will likely 
be limited. However, information exchange could con-
tribute to confidence building and developing response 
mechanisms. As cyber attacks are a major threat to the 
energy sector and growing tool of hybrid warfare, and 
that energy provision is often a means of proving or 
denying political legitimacy, this is an area in need of 
common ground and approaches across countries and 
energy regions. 
‘Soft’ Energy Security Risks 
While the majority of identified risks could escalate 
to hard security risks, many complex risks involve 
the interplay of political, social and economic factors. 
These risks, which we call ‘soft’, are tied in part to 
cross-border rules for energy governance and trade 
and have geopolitical dimensions. 
This includes the primarily political and economic 
risks associated with pipeline politics, ranging from 
abuse of market power to political vulnerability as a 
function of dependence, with the potential for physi-
cal disruption. Related risks stem from the transport 
of energy via fixed infrastructure and closely (though 
not exclusively) associated with natural gas trans-
mission via fixed pipeline as oil’s fungibility enables 
a wider variety of transport options, vehicles, routes 
and countries. This infrastructure can be prohibitively 
expensive, and pipelines and oil and gas infrastruc-
ture “often exhibit natural monopoly features” and 
are subjected “to stronger forms of political control” 
than other industries, exposing the midstream sector 
to risks.71 
Short-term risks include disputes over tariffs, 
pricing, transit fees and volumes that affect supply, 
and perceptions that energy provision and trade could 
be used as a political tool. Long-term risks include 
geopolitical tension and competition over current and 
future cross-border pipeline projects, including how 
and where resources are transported to markets and 
consumers and who receives the rents. Risks related 
 
71 Albert Bressard, “The Role of Markets and Investment 
in Global Energy”, in The Handbook of Global Energy Policy 
(see note 30), chapter 1, 16. 
to pipeline politics often manifest in concerns, real or 
perceived, that pipeline owners, suppliers of pipeline-
delivered oil or gas or transit states may use their 
positions as a source of advantage or coercion and 
that contractual dependencies are vulnerabilities. For 
planned or future pipelines, the challenge is bringing 
public and private sector stakeholders together along 
a proposed route, particularly relevant for the EU in 
Central Asia and South-Eastern Europe. 
In recent years, the EU has designed processes to 
identify Projects of Common Interest, Projects of 
Energy Community Interest and Projects of Mutual 
Interest. However, these processes are largely internal 
to the EU and the Energy Community, whereas much 
of planned or expected cross-border electricity and gas 
pipeline activity is driven by Russia and China in the 
Central Asian Republics. The development of an EEU 
energy market and the OBOR initiative will also have 
structural and systemic impacts on the EU. While there 
have been discussions about potential cooperation 
platforms, there is not yet a network planning or ex-
change platform for interaction between the EU Ten 
Year Development Plan and third parties planning to 
build new export pipelines to Europe. 
There are also energy risks implicit in on-going 
territorial, jurisdictional and ownership disputes. 
Resources can exacerbate or otherwise get caught in 
the middle of broader geopolitical issues, including 
disputes over land and maritime borders (e.g. Caspian 
Sea), Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and offshore 
resources (e.g. Cyprus) and disagreements over pipe-
line jurisdiction (e.g. Nord Stream 2 and South Stream). 
Infrastructure also criss-crosses disputed territories, 
for example in Eastern Ukraine, Crimea and Georgia. 
Not only do these risks involve all energy types, the 
larger overarching issues and conflicts are notoriously 
difficult to resolve, as international law lacks clear 
norms for resolving these cases, let alone for tackling 
the energy issues embedded within them.72 Binding 
and non-binding means of dispute resolution are often 
designed to resolve the dispute as a whole, rather than 
grapple with the role of energy within that dispute. 
Thus, in many instances progress in resolving energy 
issues is hampered by a lack of progress on the broader 
dispute. Sometimes, the resources themselves are part 
of these competing claims, as in the Caspian Sea.73 
 
72 The Carter Center, Approaches to Solving Territorial Conflicts 
(Atlanta, GA, May 2010), accessible: https://www.ciaonet.org/ 
attachments/17937/uploads. 
73 The states surrounding the Caspian Sea have largely 
argued for whichever definition best serves their interests. 
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However, energy can also serve as a point of mutual or 
overlapping interest or a starting point for confidence 
building measures for future progress. 
Many of these risks are located at sea. As offshore 
energy has grown increasingly accessible and attrac-
tive, the number of boundary disputes has grown.74 
Examples can be found in the waters around Cyprus, 
the Caspian Sea or in the Arctic. The 1982 United 
National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
governs jurisdiction and trade in maritime areas and 
is used to resolve maritime boundary disputes.75 Not 
all countries are party to the convention, Turkey being 
a notable exception, while the US recognizes UNCLOS 
as customary international law but has not signed 
the convention and Iran has signed but not ratified it. 
Signatories can also exempt themselves from dispute 
resolution provisions, an option which Russia, Iran 
and Ukraine have all exercised. The regime also only 
applies to international bodies of water beyond the 
jurisdiction of nation states and provides little guid-
ance in cases where the status of the body of water (as 
inland sea versus lake) is under dispute, a shortcom-
ing evident in the Caspian Sea. International bodies 
of water beyond the jurisdiction of any one nation are 
governed by UNCLOS, while water bodies like lakes are 
determined under Admiralty Law, adjudicated by 
national courts versus international arbitration bodies 
under UNCLOS.76 
The case of offshore gas in Cyprus’ EEZ illustrates 
another UNCLOS shortcoming – namely, that it is of 
little assistance if one party to the dispute is not a sig-
 
Azerbaijan would largely benefit from the division of re-
sources based on each respective country’s EEZ and has, 
therefore, historically argued in favour of the Caspian Sea 
being classified as a sea (and thus under the application of 
UNCLOS). Meanwhile Russia and Iran have historically argued 
in favour of being classified as a lake, dating to the 1921 
Friendship Treaty between the Russia and Iran, and have 
argued for division of resources under the condominium 
principle. More recently, Russia has pursued a bilateral 
approach with each of the littoral states based on the “com-
mon waters, divided bottom” principle. 
74 Tim Martin, “Energy and International Boundaries”, 
in Research Handbook on International Energy Law, ed. Talus 
(see note 43), 181–96 (181). 
75 UNCLOS establishes sovereign rights and a legal frame-
work for the world’s oceans, establishing zones to determine 
state sovereignty, including the territorial sea, the continen-
tal shelf, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the contigu-
ous zone. 
76 Hanna Zimnitskaya and James von Geldern, “Is the Cas-
pian Sea a Sea; and Why Does It Matter?”, Journal of Eurasian 
Studies 2 (2011): 1–14 (3). 
natory to the convention. Turkey is the only UN mem-
ber state that has not signed UNCLOS. It does not 
recognize Cyprus’ agreements under UNCLOS with 
other eastern Mediterranean countries, nor the legiti-
macy of the Republic of Cyprus. The Ukraine crisis also 
illustrates how territorial disputes can call the delimi-
tation of maritime borders under UNCLOS into ques-
tion. While the ICJ fixed the maritime boundary 
between Romania and Ukraine in its 2009 judgement 
in the case, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea, the 
Russian seizure of Crimea could result in Russia laying 
claim to certain parts of the Black Sea. 
Major risks also stem from the previously described 
fragmentation as energy risks arise along regulatory 
fault lines where differing regulatory jurisdictions, 
legal regimes, contractual spaces and blocs overlap or 
come into contact – and potential conflict – with one 
another. Regulatory disconnect and disagreements 
stemming from policy or market integration can 
occur on or between the fault lines of differing eco-
nomic or political blocs, and countries can find them-
selves caught between, left straddling or outside of 
existing spaces and jurisdictions. This includes coun-
tries like Ukraine and Moldova, Energy Community 
members on which Russia relies for energy transit but 
which declined to join the EEU. 
When regulatory/legal spaces interact, it is not 
always obvious which set of rules will prevail or how 
to resolve potential conflict, creating uncertainty and 
potentially stalling investment. Disagreement over the 
rules of the game and different interests (a bloc of pro-
ducers and a bloc of consumers) could lead to different 
desired end states, such as competitive markets versus 
quotas, price setting or other forms of market manage-
ment. Specific problems include incompatibility of 
system operation codes, voltages and frequencies, 
tariff structures, capacity allocation mechanisms, con-
gestion management procedures and other technical 
issues, along with different operational procedures, 
organizational structures and working definitions. 
These incompatibilities may result in commercial 
and/or technical disputes that can negatively impact 
energy flows and exacerbate broader security issues. 
This is particularly relevant for cross border elec-
tricity transmission and integration of electricity and 
gas markets. Electricity transmission, particularly 
between markets and countries, requires physical 
interconnections and technical arrangements, com-
plementary and cooperative institutional structures, 
shared technical terms and convergent price struc-
tures. Energy system and flow management requires 
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information sharing for network planning, operation 
and disaster response. While the challenge of ‘grid 
management’ is somewhat less salient for natural 
gas transmission, pricing and tariff issues, along 
with infrastructure access, are key. 
Risks should be thought about in different time 
horizons, namely short- and long-term. While both 
should be addressed, action should be taken to pre-
vent long-term risks, particularly given the long lead-
time for energy sector projects. Price volatility and 
boom-and-bust cycles are major looming risks, while 
stalled investment can have severe long-term effects. 
This stalled investment can stem from energy sector 
sanctions levied by the West against Iran and Russia 
prohibiting technology transfer and access to financ-
ing and more direct sanctions on imports and exports. 
This could delay future investment and call previous 
investment into doubt, derail private sector partner-
ships, impede modernization and even result in 
environmental hazards through reliance on second-
best technology options.77 
More abstract risks stem from the unpredictability 
of energy development pathways. Should the world 
continue to become more interconnected, national/ 
regional interests will grow more heterogeneous, 
necessitating an exchange about supply and demand 
models and energy paths. Many regimes and countries 
are still reliant on resource revenue, and domestic 
energy market governance is crucial for the energy 
transition. Risks also stem from changing trade dy-
namics and tensions between market incumbents, 
along with policy changes that could negatively 
influence energy investment, production and provi-
sion. Given the changing energy landscape, these risks 
are particularly relevant as policies incentivizing low-
carbon energy sources and trade patterns redrawn by 
changing production dynamics shift political align-
ments and policy preferences. To address these issues, 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) is conducting a “pathways project”,78 sup-
ported by Russia, Germany and the US. UNECE work-
ing groups on energy efficiency standards and classifi-
cation of energy carriers are important contributions 
to building a common understanding of energy 
future(s). 
 
77 Morgunova and Westphal, Offshore Hydrocarbon Resources 
in the Arctic (see note 33). 
78 https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/energy/se/pdfs/ 
Booklet_Dec2015/Pathways.to.Sustainable.Energy.pdf (ac-
cessed 20 December 2016). 
Environmental and Climate Hazards 
Energy production, use and consumption can pose 
risks for environmental integrity via pollution, con-
tamination, leaks and other technical failures. In 
addition to these traditional environmental risks, 
awareness of climate risks is increasing. A G7 report 
labelled climate change the “ultimate threat multi-
plier,” a useful description of how climate change 
could create new risks and compound existing ones.79 
While the premise of shifting energy landscapes is 
predicated in part on climate mitigation, the effects 
of climate change on the energy system, particularly 
system stability amid growing interconnection, create 
a new set of risks as climate change has the potential 
to “transform constants into variables”.80 
Climate change will exacerbate dependencies 
between different sectors, from water management 
and energy generation to agriculture and food pro-
duction, referred to as the energy-water nexus and the 
energy-water-food nexus. The nexus approach recog-
nizes interdependencies between resources crucial to 
human and economic development. This nexus, which 
represents a shift from sector-specific approaches to 
integrated policies and resource management, has 
profound implications for environmental and 
economic security as well as human and hard security. 
This is particularly relevant in Central Asia where 
transboundary water issues are prevalent, hydropower 
production is prominent and agricultural production 
is a key economic driver. The Amu Dayra river basin 
is a case in point.81 As a crucial source of water for 
regional agricultural and energy production, it has 
historically been a political flashpoint. The current 
quota-based water sharing system has proved less than 
 
79 G7, A New Climate For Peace: Taking Action on Climate and 
Fragility Risks (2015), accessible: https://www.newclimatefor 
peace.org/#report-top. 
80 Achim Maas, Shifting Bases, Shifting Perils: A Scoping Study 
on Security Implications of Climate Change in the OSCE Region 
and Beyond, Adelphi Research in cooperation with Chatham 
House, Cimera, commissioned by the Office of the Coordi-
nator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (Ber-
lin, 2010), 1, accessible: https://www.adelphi.de/en/system/ 
files/mediathek/bilder/us_054_-_final_scoping_study_osce. 
pdf. 
81 The Amu Darya is the longest river in Central Asia, flow-
ing from sources mainly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Turk-
menistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Event Report: Trigger-
ing Cooperation across the Food-Water-Energy Nexus in Central Asia 
(New York: The EastWest Institute, December 2014), acces-
sible: http://www.iwa-network.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 
06/Food-Water-Energy-Nexus-in-Central-Asia.pdf. 
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effective and is unlikely to hold amid fluctuating 
water volumes due to the impacts of climate change 
(through changing glacier melt patterns, increased 
rates of evaporation, etc.). Hydroelectric projects and 
their effect on available downstream water volumes 
(namely for agricultural production) are a particular 
source of controversy, as illustrated by the Rogun Dam 
project.82 
Water supply can also endanger agricultural pro-
duction and food supply, political relations, economic 
development and security in the region. Increased 
Chinese investment in land and agriculture in Central 
Asia (and potential Chinese agricultural technology), 
including in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, 
could exacerbate regional tensions over land and water 
use.83 In Kazakhstan, Chinese companies reportedly 
are considering investing $1.9 billion in 19 agricultural 
projects as part of the Silk Road Economic Belt. While 
Chinese investment could improve the efficiency 
of Kazakh agricultural production and diversify the 
economy from oil, Chinese land ownership in par-
ticular has proved a sensitive topic. 
There is growing awareness of the risks related to 
the ‘nexus’ between climate, energy, water and food, 
and many international institutions are raising aware-
ness and addressing the issues.84 Regional organiza-
tions are including the nexus in environmental and 
economic programming, including the OSCE through 
its Central Asia programming, while its annual eco-
nomic and environmental forum has focused on trans-
boundary water management and the relationship 
between environmental governance and security. The 
OSCE is also a member of the ENVSEC partnership, 
a cooperation platform that includes the Regional 
Environment Center for Central and Eastern Europe, 
 
82 The hydropower project would use a tributary of the 
Amu Darya to produce 13.3 kWh of electricity for Tajikistan, 
leaving less water for downstream Uzbekistan and inflaming 
regional tensions over transboundary water management. 
83 Jack Farchy, “China Plans to Invest $1.9bn in Kazakh Agri-
culture”, The Financial Times, 9 May 2016, accessible at: https:// 
www.ft.com/content/9c84a0f4-15d3-11e6-9d98-00386a18e39d. 
84 These risks are in part reflected in the inclusion of energy, 
water and food-related goals as part of the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals (although it should be noted that these 
issues are represented by individual goals) and the work of 
SE4ALL, but also focused on in the World Energy Outlook 2016 
by the IEA. The EU, in partnership with the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has 
also funded the creation of a global nexus platform and secre-
tariat to serve as a hub for information exchange and support 
regional dialogues. 
UNDP, UNECE and UNEP. ENVSEC addresses cross-
border resource management issues to identify and 
raise awareness of hot spots or risks, develop regional 
work programs to address them and support mitiga-
tion measures. 
Connectivity: Risk, Opportunity or 
Organizing Principle? 
Should energy trends lead to more cross-border, 
regional and global trade, the risks and opportunities 
of connectivity will become increasingly relevant. Poor 
or inadequate grid interconnection can pose risks for 
system stability, while increasing grid or technical in-
tegration and interconnected systems can create new 
concerns. Connectivity necessitates the establishment 
of a dynamic market environment in which the EU can 
remain competitive, and also creates opportunities to 
seize, like modernizing the energy system, balancing 
supply and demand, and fostering and perpetuating a 
new sustainable growth model. However, connectivity 
is also not assured, and failing to mitigate the risks of 
integration could push developments in the opposite 
direction, particularly as technology enables more 
distributed or local generation. 
Increasing connectivity relies on multilateral 
energy governance, improving international coopera-
tion through existing institutions, strengthening tools 
and ultimately establishing inclusive patterns for 
growth. It relies on integration to create markets of 
scale, opportunities for leveraging resources and in-
vestment in the infrastructure undergirding connec-
tivity. While poor grid interconnections are a risk, 
interconnection can improve affordability, security 
and sustainability of energy supplies and increase 
efficiency. Interconnection can also help ameliorate 
challenges associated with integrating renewables, 
including back-up capacity, intermittency and grid 
management. 
To ensure connectivity, the EU and others need 
to consider common energy guidelines, technical 
standards, regulatory best practices and principles 
that can be shared across jurisdictions or different 
energy spaces. While continuity of standards and 
streamlining of systems can provide certainty and 
incentivize investment, policy and regulatory dis-
sonance can cause confusion and uncertainty and 
stymie investment. The EU and its member states must 
also be aware of the risks that new economic and 
market orders could pose in offering competing sets 
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of technical norms and standards and preferential 
trade benefits, some of which could be detrimental to 
EU competitiveness. Absent common standards, the 
goal of connectivity could be at risk of devolving into 
fragmentation between different economic blocs, mar-
ket orders and regional groups. 
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Tools and Instruments at Hand to Address 
Changing Energy Geography 
 
Energy Governance Challenges from a 
European Perspective 
The challenges outlined in this paper demonstrate 
the need and opportunity to empower existing insti-
tutions to assume a greater role in energy and create 
new tools to address energy-related risks. Most of the 
new and looming risks are hybrid and crosscutting. 
Addressing them will require cooperation and pooling 
tools and instruments across institutions in a way not 
seen in the past, while connectivity raises questions 
of which rules, standards and norms will govern these 
activities and relationships. Current actors and insti-
tutions lack the capacity or tools to address these risks 
alone and the necessary dialogue platforms, coopera-
tion mechanisms, and common standards are missing. 
A major challenge remains for Europe. The EU’s 
attractiveness as a “pole” is fading amid internal crisis 
and BREXIT, while the diminishing appeal of its ener-
gy acquis as a tool is exposing the limits to European 
energy governance and gaps between the aquis and the 
Energy Charter Treaty. That is not to say there have 
not been successes – there has been substantial pro-
gress in internal energy market reforms in the EU 
and the European neighbourhood, and in gas sector 
reform in Ukraine, although the outcome of broader 
energy reforms remains to be seen. However, the 
geopolitical conflict and lack of coordinated policy is 
affecting the EU and its wider neighbourhood, and 
in the resulting security dilemma the energy security 
paradigm could prevail over climate and environmen-
tal concerns. 
The EU’s soft influence as a normative power is 
vanishing as it is confronted in the neighbourhood 
by revisionist states aspiring to increase their power. 
Turkey has drifted from the EU and the danger of 
“growing disagreement about the rules of the game 
and a decreasing ability to manage crises” is loom-
ing.85 Multilateralism is in crisis, and the proliferation 
of states with authoritarian regimes and state-run 
economies may weaken international institutions and 
lead to protectionism.86 The reliability of the US as a 
 
85 Statoil, Energy Perspectives 2016 (see note 56), 11. 
86 Ibid. 
major Western partner is also in question given the 
Trump Administration’s thus far sceptical view of 
international organizations and multilateral engage-
ment and willingness to disregard or upend norms, 
trends, and precedents in its conduct of international 
relations. 
Institutions, Tools and Instruments 
While specific institutions or sets of rules govern dif-
ferent aspects of energy production, transit and trade, 
many of these regimes and standards are “opt in” and 
not always binding. Additionally, though a number of 
institutions, regimes and tools address energy risks at 
the regional level, there is no overarching regulatory 
framework, institution or set of standards across all 
parties. The creation of new structures is not feasible 
given insufficient political will and limited economic 
resources, necessitating the utilization of existing 
institutions, forums, mechanisms and processes for 
dialogue, confidence building and cooperation. 
Multilateral engagement, cooperation through 
existing institutions and common rules of the game 
(“code of conduct”) are increasingly important amid 
plans to increase energy trade and connectivity across 
Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe. It is no co-
incidence that China has introduced a connectivity 
framework based on infrastructure (OBOR), expressed 
interest in regimes like the Energy Charter Process 
and signed the International Energy Charter. For a 
country looking outward for trade, economic oppor-
tunity and energy, Eurasia offers many obstacles – 
namely, which rules or regulations apply to projects 
crossing the EU and the EEU. This question, and the 
related questions related to engagement with the SCO 
and responding to OBOR, is critical for the EU. 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is the only multi-
lateral treaty providing energy-specific provisions 
governing trade, transit and investment protection 
and has the largest geographical scope of any multi-
lateral investment protection treaty.87 It covers: 
 
87 Angus Johnston and Guy Block, EU Energy Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 284. 
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1. Protection of foreign investment; 2. Non-discrimi-
natory provisions for trade in energy materials, prod-
ucts and energy-related equipment and provisions 
to ensure reliable cross-border energy transit flows; 
3. Dispute settlement mechanisms between partici-
pating states and between investors and host states; 
4. Promotion of energy efficiency. 
However, the ECT has largely stalled following 
the termination of Russia’s Provisional Application 
in 2009, the EU’s preference for the Neighbourhood 
Policy and the Energy Community88and Italy’s formal 
withdrawal in 2015. The fracturing of support, which 
can be traced to the 2003 introduction of the Second 
Energy Package, could lead to conflict over which set 
of rules should serve as a baseline for cooperation 
moving forward.89 The ECT has its origins in the neo-
liberal 1990s when buyers set the rules, and major 
producers, including Norway and the United States, 
have abstained from either ratifying or signing it.90 
The ECT also has substantive shortcomings, includ-
ing “weak and unclear” provisions governing transit 
interference.91 The ECT failed to live up to expecta-
tions during the 2006 and 2009 transit crises between 
Russia and Ukraine, and does not address the resto-
ration or reinstatement of energy flows to pre-crisis 
levels following a disruption.92 While there were nego-
tiations on a Transit Protocol, they were suspended in 
2011 due to disagreement between the EU, Russia and 
 
88 See in more detail: Kirsten Westphal, The Energy Charter 
Treaty Revisited. The Russian Proposal for an International Energy 
Convention and the Energy Charter Treaty, SWP Comments 8/2011 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2011). 
89 Kim Talus, EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), chapter 6: “The Inter-
national Dimension of EU Law and Policy”, 212–68 (243). 
90 The ECT is based on long-established practices in bilateral 
investment treaties as well as WTO trade provisions. It pro-
vides two types of investment protection: binding hard law 
obligations for the post-establishment phase of investments, 
and soft law obligations for the pre-establishment phase 
(Talus, EU Energy Law and Policy [see note 89], chapter 6, 237). 
These investment protections include access to binding 
international dispute resolution mechanisms, both state-to-
state and investor-to-state, including access to arbitration 
forums: the International Centre for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID), International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) Stockholm, or United National Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Disputes can be also be pursued 
through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
91 Katja Yafimava, “Transit: The EU Energy Acquis and the 
Energy Charter Treaty”, in Research Handbook on International 
Energy Law, ed. Talus (see note 43), 593–623 (613). 
92 Ibid. 
the Energy Charter Secretariat.93 There has since been 
little momentum to address these shortcomings. Turk-
menistan has sponsored the only UN resolutions on 
energy transit,94 and their 2017 Chairmanship of the 
Energy Charter Conference could be an opportunity 
to discuss transit governance gaps.95 
The ECT outlook is far from positive given the lack 
of Russian support for modernisation of the Energy 
Charter Process and the Process’ consolidation, expan-
sion and outreach, along with EU external governance 
fatigue. However, the Energy Charter Secretariat has 
driven the process forward, producing the 2015 Inter-
national Energy Charter, which encompasses a range 
of countries and issues, including those related to the 
energy transition, and provides common principles. 
While the Charter is a declaration of intent rather than 
a legally binding code or commitment, it could serve 
as the basis for binding shared principles across regions 
given its reflection of modern energy challenges and 
the high level of participation in its negotiation. 
The OSCE, NATO and United National Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) are all regional 
organisations with the role and potential to take on 
these energy risks and crisis management. Given the 
degree of institutional capability and capacity across 
these organisations, the EU should encourage coopera-
tion and coordination between them. While NATO 
has assumed a role in energy security and critical infra-
structure protection, the operationalization of this 
role in practice remains unclear. NATO continues 
to see energy as primarily an issue for markets and 
nation states, an understandable approach as em-
phasizing the security dimension of energy would 
likely deepen existing fault lines and run the risk of 
an energy bloc confrontation. 
The OSCE is a trusted honest broker whose tradi-
tional competencies in risk mitigation and preven-
tion, awareness raising and crisis management could 
be used to address energy risks. The OSCE’s competency 
in hard, economic and human security encompasses 
 
93 “Meeting of the Energy Charter Industry Advisory Panel”, 
Beijing, 21 July 2015, 3–4, accessible: http://www.energycharter. 
org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/IAP/20150721/IAP20150721-
S2-Notes_on_transit.pdf. 
94 The two resolutions are UNRES 67/268 adopted in 2013 
and 63/219 adopted in 2008. 
95 Rafael Leal-Arcas, Andrew Filis, and Ehab S. Abu Gosh, 
International Energy Governance: Selected Legal Issues (Cheltenham, 
UK, and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2014), Part 1, 
chapter 2: “Energy as a Special Sector in the World Trade 
Organization”, 112. 
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many of the potential impacts of energy risks and is 
well suited to addressing the complex and intercon-
nected risks stemming from climate change. The 
geographical breadth and depth of OSCE membership 
is relevant for addressing the issues between Europe 
and its eastern neighbours, while its traditional tool-
box and focus on connectivity are pertinent to the 
challenges at hand. It can also address issues in the 
Eastern Mediterranean via its fourth dimension. 
The UNECE, perhaps in partnership with OSCE, 
is also positioned to assume more responsibility for 
mitigating energy risks. In 2004, the UNECE and OSCE 
pledged to work together on several relevant issues 
for energy risk, including trade, transport and invest-
ment.96 UNECE also has competence in sustainable 
energy and environmental policy and convenes ex-
perts on natural gas and renewables. It also engages 
in setting standards and promoting best practices, 
which, along with its broad membership and eco-
nomic mission, could enable UNECE to play a stronger 
role in fostering connectivity and shared principles. 
Recommendations for European Engagement 
and Action 
Given the current fatigue in the EU, the lack of inter-
est in multilateral engagement in the US and the 
strategic use of bilateralism in Russia, there is little 
impetus for or chance of creating new institutions – 
thus, the only opportunity is to reinvigorate and 
expand existing institutions. It is in Germany and 
Europe’s interest to uphold free trade and a liberal, 
rule-based market order as the EU is an energy im-
porter reliant on external suppliers for more than 
half its energy consumption, making.97 For the EU to 
remain competitive, rules and norms must provide a 
level playing field for actors across Eurasia and pave 
the way for the Germany and other EU member states 
to export the technology and products needed for the 
energy transition. This will require the EU to redirect 
its focus from navel-gazing to horizon scanning. 
Based on these identities and interests, Germany 
and the EU should promote and strengthen existing 
rules and norms and advocate the spread of common 
 
96 As agreed in a December 2004 Memorandum of Under-
standing between the OSCE and UNECE, accessible: http:// 
www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/cefact/mou/MoU-OSCE.pdf. 
97 Eurostat, accessible: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ 
statisticsexplained/index.php/Energy_production_and_ 
imports. 
frameworks. EU member states and Brussels should 
also support and uphold international frameworks 
they are members of and reaffirm commitments to 
multilateral institutions and initiatives that establish 
the baseline for cooperation across Europe and Asia. 
Otherwise, the EU may find itself outside newly 
emerging regional dynamics. The EU has to attend 
to and fulfil its role and responsibility as a driver of 
technology and innovation and a promoter of norms 
and governance, meeting the needs and seizing the 
opportunities of an energy transition in accordance 
with the Paris Agreement. Falling into the trap of 
short-term crisis management instead of pursuing 
long-term goals will become much more difficult if 
the EU does not ‘reimagine’ and manage energy secu-
rity threats and risks. 
Existing institutions have to be utilized to coordi-
nate policies to address energy-related risks and spear-
head efforts to bridge the divide between differing 
regulatory or legal spaces. The EU can enhance its 
assistance to Energy Community countries to develop 
infrastructure hardware along with the acquis software 
and invest political capital in promoting the Energy 
Charter Process and the International Energy Charter. 
The EU should also re-invigorate support for multi-
lateral instruments like the OSCE and UNECE that 
help facilitate an eye-to eye approach with Russia. 
Overall, the EU must promote awareness, dialogue 
and mutual trust; shape and manage connectivity; 
enhance crisis management as it relates to energy and 
engage in the creation and promotion of a common 
code of conduct across different jurisdictions and 
regulatory and regional spaces. 
 Promote Awareness and Dialogue: To improve aware-
ness and establish common ground, the EU will have 
to support the creation of dialogue platforms to dis-
cuss issues that cross national and regional boundaries 
and require cooperation. Opportunities for dialogue 
not only to bring together private and public sector 
stakeholders but also foster coordination amongst 
different institutional actors that possess the tools 
necessary to address energy risks but lack the coordi-
nation mechanisms necessary to leverage them. Dia-
logue platforms, specifically for critical infrastructure, 
trade and transit, can provide a forum for diverse 
actors to discuss shared interests and challenges and 
develop rules of the road. Discussion platforms should 
not be limited to technical, operational or regulatory 
issues but also address the security climate and facili-
tate opportunities for cooperation while limiting 
room for political manoeuvre. The EU could empower 
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existing institutions to convene crosscutting working 
groups to address these issues or promote cooperation 
and dialogue between institutions like the OSCE and 
UNECE. The EU could also explore opportunities 
for technical and regulatory exchange with the EEU 
and the SCO. 
 Shape and Manage Connectivity: In a potential “inter-
connectivity” paradigm, energy infrastructure plan-
ning and protection will require further action. With 
the energy transition comes new infrastructure invest-
ment and construction, and while the EU has internal 
infrastructure planning mechanisms, there is no 
standing multilateral forum for public and private 
sector stakeholders to cooperate on cross-border infra-
structure. The OSCE could convene a discussion plat-
form or standing body for planning and emergency 
response to facilitate cooperation, coordination and 
information sharing. A multilateral infrastructure 
initiative could include or be supplemented by efforts 
to understand and map energy corridors and infra-
structure, transport routes and critical network nodes 
or hotspots. Mapping would help stakeholders visual-
ize, understand and track problems, while a common 
platform based on energy networks would facilitate 
communication and coordination across the energy 
supply chain. 
 Improve Crisis Management: Despite the current 
and looming risks, effective energy crisis management 
mechanisms are lacking. Including and addressing 
energy risks in crisis management efforts is critical, 
as is taking both current and potential long-term risks 
into account. Improved crisis management in the 
neighbourhood will require new methods of con-
certed cross-organizational cooperation and enhanced 
tools to deal with the interface between geopolitics 
and energy. This is an opportunity to enhance the role 
of the OSCE, with its crisis management competency 
and environmental and energy security mandate. The 
OSCE’s traditional toolbox and on-the-ground pres-
ence could easily be applied to energy risks under the 
umbrella of broader crisis management capabilities. 
In dealing specifically with ‘frozen’ conflicts, the OSCE 
could be a facilitator for a status neutral approach to 
ensure continued service provision and uninterrupted 
energy flows per the OSCE’s role in humanitarian 
issues and human security.98 The afore mentioned 
 
98 Such an approach would leave aside the status of out-
standing territorial issues in order to address shared energy 
challenges and enable cooperation. This is particularly rele-
vant in military conflict or hybrid warfare situations where 
timely restoration of gas or electricity supply is paramount in 
OSCE platform/standing body for planning and emer-
gency response could also include or improve on the 
cross-border cooperation of CERTs and industrial con-
trol emergency response teams by having a standing 
list of contacts for an emergency along a corridor or 
integrated system. 
 Bridge Governance Gaps and Fault Lines: The growing 
potential for energy fault lines, particularly with the 
EEU and OBOR, must be alleviated. The EU should be 
strategic and proactive, rather than ad hoc and reac-
tive, in engaging with new regional blocs. Proactive 
engagement with the EEU could capitalize on oppor-
tunities for technical, operational and regulatory 
cooperation between the EU, Energy Community and 
EEU and the potential to develop a minimum set of 
compatible regulatory and technical guidelines and 
to bridge the regulatory fault lines. This includes 
harmonizing network codes and increasing coopera-
tion at intersections or borders, as well as addressing 
issues like the cost-reflectivity of non-regulated tariffs, 
technical and regulatory arrangements for congestion 
management and cross-border capacity allocation and 
defining regulatory roles and functions. The formu-
lation, dissemination and adoption of common prin-
ciples would mitigate the risks of regulatory fault 
lines while fostering connectivity and enabling inte-
gration and cross-border energy projects. 
Ultimately, connectivity and competiveness are 
crucial to Germany and the EU’s future. Both have 
an interest in promoting connectivity, along with the 
rules of the road necessary to achieve this goal and 
transform risks into opportunities. The EU could offer 
the code of conduct to countries seeking both to par-
ticipate in regional trade and guard against encroach-
ment by regional powers and strong state-backed com-
panies. This would also provide a set of standards EU 
companies could count on when expanding into new 
markets across the continent. The EU can use the code 
of conduct as a tool to promote to ensure competition 
and connectivity on its own terms, to preserve and 
extend market principles in the pursuit of a level play-
ing field and to conquer open spaces for EU tech-
nology in pursuit of the energy transition.
 
order to prevent humanitarian emergency (see Øverland 
et al., Energy Security and the OSCE [see note58], 7). 
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Abbreviations 
ACER Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
CEIP Critical Infrastructure Protection 
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team 
COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
ECT Energy Charter Treaty 
EEA European Economic Area 
EEU Eurasian Economic Union 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
ENTSO-E European Network of Transmission System Operators 
for Electricity 
ENTSO-G European Network of Transmission System Operators 
for Gas 
ENVSEC The Environment and Security Initiative 
EPCIP European Programme for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
HVDC High-Voltage, Direct Current 
ICC International Chamber of Commerce 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes 
IEA International Energy Agency 
INDC Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency 
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
kWh Kilowatt Hours 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
Mtoe Million Tons of Oil Equivalent 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NNCEIP Non-Nuclear Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection 
NUPI Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt / Norwegian Institute 
of International Affairs (Oslo) 
OBOR One Belt, One Road 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 
OIES Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (Oxford, UK) 
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PV Photovoltaic 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 
SE4ALL Sustainable Energy for All 
TEN-E Trans-European Networks 
TSO Transmission System Operator 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UN United Nations 
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
WTO World Trade Organization 
